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THE U.S. SUPREME COURT’S
CHARACTERIZATIONS OF THE PRESS:
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY*
RONNELL ANDERSEN JONES & SONJA R. WEST**
The erosion of constitutional norms in the United States is at the center of an
urgent national debate. Among the most crucial of these issues is the fragile and
deteriorating relationship between the press and the government. While scholars
have responded with sophisticated examinations of the President’s and
legislators’ characterizations of the news media, one branch of government has
received little scrutiny—the U.S. Supreme Court. This gap in the scholarship is
remarkable in light of the Court’s role as the very institution entrusted with
safeguarding the rights of the press. This Article presents the findings of the first
comprehensive empirical examination of the Court’s depictions of the press. We
tracked every reference to the press by a U.S. Supreme Court Justice in the
Court’s opinions since 1784. We coded these references to the press (broadly
defined by the Justices themselves) for the presence of common frames and
whether the frame was conveyed with a positive, negative, or neutral tone. The
results of our study reveal troubling trends at the Court with widespread
implications for any discussion of contemporary press freedom. We find that there
has been a stark deterioration in both the quantity and quality of the Court’s
depictions of the press across a variety of measures. Our data show that the
Justices are now less likely to talk about the press than they were in the past, and
that, when they do, it is more often in a negative light. At this decisive moment,
when we have seen the risks of executive and legislative branch attacks on the
press, our study finds that the U.S. Supreme Court is not pushing back. It also
illuminates the press-characterizing behaviors of the most and least pressfriendly Justices of all time and of the Justices currently on the bench, providing
insights into patterns that might be expected in the years to come.
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INTRODUCTION
The erosion of constitutional norms in the United States is at the center
of an urgent national debate. Among the most crucial of these issues—brought
into sharp focus during the Trump administration—is the fragile and
deteriorating relationship between the press and government institutions.1
Many scholars and commentators have responded by examining the impact of
the President’s and legislators’ depictions of the news media and emphasizing
the potential dangers that arise when those characterizations become
1. See SARAH REPUCCI, FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM AND THE MEDIA 2019: A DOWNWARD
SPIRAL 3 (2019), https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-02/FINAL07162019_Freedom_
And_The_Media_2019_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/57U2-YNDY] (“[P]ress freedom has come under
unusual pressure in the United States, the world’s leading democratic power. . . . President Donald
Trump’s continual vilification of the press has seriously exacerbated an ongoing erosion of public
confidence in the mainstream media.”); see also Peter L. Strauss, Eroding “Checks” on Presidential
Authority—Norms, the Civil Service, and the Courts, 94 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 581, 588–89 (2019)
(discussing how U.S. politicians “intimidate the free press” and “use the very institutions of
democracy—gradually, subtly, and even legally—to kill it”); Stephen J. Wermiel, Freedom of the Press:
Challenges to This Pillar of Democracy, INSIGHTS ON L. & SOC’Y (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.american
bar.org/groups/public_education/publications/insights-on-law-and-society/volume-19/insights-vol-19issue-2/freedom-of-the-press/ [https://perma.cc/EJF6-2H4C] (“More than two centuries [after our
nation’s founding], is the news media still seen as a pillar of freedom, a bulwark against
tyranny?”); RonNell Andersen Jones & Lisa Grow Sun, Enemy Construction and the Press, 49 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 1301, 1351 (2017) (“If the press is effectively constructed as an ‘enemy’ dangerous to
the American people [as the Trump Administration attempted to do], . . . press protections might
be eroded . . . .”); Erik Wemple, Opinion, Devin Nunes’s Anti-Media Rant, Annotated, WASH. POST
(Nov. 19, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/11/19/devin-nuness-anti-mediarant-annotated/ [https://perma.cc/Y4A6-ZXM3 (dark archive)] (quoting U.S. Representative Devin
Nunes, who proclaimed that there is a “disconnect” between reality and what “mainstream media
accounts describ[e]”); Ben Mathis-Lilley, Rep. Jim Jordan Complains that CNN Is Doing “Fake News” by
Interviewing People About Him, SLATE (July 11, 2019), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/07/jimjordan-tweet-cnn-interviews-fake-news.html [https://perma.cc/2QAV-KBM8] (reporting on U.S.
Representative Jim Jordan’s tweet criticizing the media, calling CNN “desperate” and “#fakenews”).
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increasingly negative.2 Throughout this discussion, however, there has been
little scrutiny of the views of the press emanating from another powerful
governmental institution—the U.S. Supreme Court. While there is increased
awareness of the perils of the political branches’ negative attitudes toward the
press, it is often still assumed that the Court is the same reliable protector of
press rights that it was half a century ago, when the Justices viewed the press as
a “powerful antidote” to government abuse3 and a necessary component of
democracy.4 The validity of this assumption, however, is entirely unclear—in
large part because there has been almost no substantive investigation of the
Court’s evolving attitudes about the press and the role of journalism in our
society.5
Determining the Court’s view of the press is a surprisingly difficult task.
This is because the Court has recognized virtually all of the press’s substantive
protections under the umbrella of general First Amendment free speech
protections for all speakers, rather than in press-specific rulings.6 Therefore,
almost everything we know about the Justices’ views on the value and
constitutional importance of the press has been communicated instead through
press-praising dicta—frequent declarations by the Justices about the unique
roles of the press in our democracy.7 In other words, many of the press’s claims
to constitutional importance hinge not on substantive law, but on the Justices’
rhetoric about the significance of the press. Thus, understanding the Justices’
characterizations of the press—as well as any changes in the tone of those
2. See Statement of A.G. Sulzberger, Publisher, New York Times, Response to President
Trump’s Tweet About Their Meeting (July 29, 2018), https://www.nytco.com/press/statement-of-a-gsulzberger-publisher-the-new-york-times-in-response-to-president-trumps-tweet-about-their-meeting
[https://perma.cc/QZ5E-49SC (dark archive)] (noting that former President Trump’s “language was
not just divisive but increasingly dangerous”); see also Michael M. Grynbaum, After Another Year of
Trump Attacks, ‘Ominous Signs’ for the American Press, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2019), https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/12/30/business/media/trump-media-2019.html [https://perma.cc/JMD9-PZ
HU (dark archive)] (explaining details regarding former President Trump’s increased attacks on the
press and the negative implications for the press).
3. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966).
4. See RonNell Andersen Jones & Sonja R. West, The Fragility of the Free American Press, 112
NW. U. L. REV. 47, 57–59 (2017) (describing these perceived assumptions as showing deference to
journalists, interpreting laws in favor of the press, and prioritizing a “free and robust” press).
5. See infra Part I.
6. See Sonja R. West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1025, 1035–36 (2011)
[hereinafter West, Awakening Press] (noting that “the Supreme Court has never recognized any
constitutional rights or protections belonging exclusively to the press that are distinct from the speech
rights that all individuals (and even corporations) enjoy and has only implicitly recognized differences
between the two in select areas” (footnotes omitted)).
7. See RonNell Andersen Jones, The Dangers of Press Clause Dicta, 48 GA. L. REV. 705, 706–07
(2014) [hereinafter Jones, Dangerous Dicta] (“The Court’s opinions in cases involving the media, while
almost uniformly reaching conclusions based on other grounds, regularly include language about the
constitutional or democratic character, duty, value, or role of the press—language that could be, but
ultimately is not, significant to the constitutional conclusion reached.”).
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characterizations over time—is of heightened importance. If the Justices no
longer depict press freedom as a public good worthy of the strongest
constitutional status, then the press’s ability to fight for legal rights and
protections may suffer.
This Article thus asks the simple questions: What is the Court’s perception
of the press, and is that perception changing over time? The answers to these
questions shed light on whether we can count on the Court to act as the backstop
for strong, American-style press freedom values, even in the face of political or
public backlash. At this critical moment, when both a changing media
landscape8 and the increased need for investigative and accountability
journalism9 push issues of press freedom squarely into the spotlight, a closer
look at the realities of the Court’s characterizations of the news media is
especially needed.
This Article presents the findings of the first comprehensive empirical
examination of the U.S. Supreme Court’s depictions of the press.10 In our study,
we tracked every reference to the press by a U.S. Supreme Court Justice in the
Court’s opinions since 1784. We coded these references to the press—broadly
defined by the Justices themselves—for the presence of common frames related
to the press, such as its historical value, its effect on government, its protection
from regulation, its impact on individuals’ reputations and privacy, and its
trustworthiness and ethics. We also recorded whether each frame was conveyed
with a positive, negative, or neutral tone.
The results of our study reveal troubling trends with widespread
implications for any discussion of contemporary press freedom. Our data show
8. See Kristen Hare, The Coronavirus Has Closed More than 50 Local Newsrooms Across America.
And Counting., POYNTER (Aug. 20, 2020), https://www.poynter.org/locally/2020/the-coronavirus-hasclosed-more-than-25-local-newsrooms-across-america-and-counting/ [https://perma.cc/5LQJ-RDAC]
(noting that roughly 1,800 newspapers have closed since 2004); see also PENELOPE MUSE ABERNATHY,
UNC HUSSMAN SCH. OF JOURNALISM & MEDIA, THE EXPANDING NEWS DESERT 8 (2018),
https://www.usnewsdeserts.com/reports/expanding-news-desert/loss-of-local-news/ [https://perma.cc
/4QGY-87UD] (noting that the “largest 25 newspaper chains own a third of all newspapers, including
two-thirds of the country’s 1,200 dailies”); Michael Barthel & Kirsten Worden, Newspaper Fact Sheet,
PEW RSCH. CTR. (July 9, 2019), https://www.journalism.org/fact-sheet/newspapers/ [https://perma.cc
/G9LL-UCEF] (finding that paper newspaper subscriptions have been declining and website audience
traffic has leveled off); Tom Stites, About 1,300 U.S. Communities Have Totally Lost News Coverage,
UNC News Desert Study Finds, POYNTER (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.poynter.org/businesswork/2018/about-1300-u-s-communities-have-totally-lost-news-coverage-unc-news-desert-study-finds
[https://perma.cc/PD6C-JUC4] (noting data showing that more than 1,300 U.S. communities have
entirely lost news coverage).
9. Andreas Adriano, Investigative Journalists Play a Key Role in Bringing Corruption to Light,
INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING WORKSHOP (Sept. 12, 2019), http://investigativereportingworkshop.
org/news/investigative-journalists-play-a-key-role-in-bringing-corruption-to-light/ [https://perma.cc/
2RX4-F565] (listing examples of major public discoveries revealed through investigative journalism).
10. RonNell Andersen Jones & Sonja R. West, Compiled Data on Press Mentions by the
Supreme Court of the United States 1784–July 2020 [hereinafter Data on Press Mentions by the
Supreme Court] (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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that the Court’s view of the press has starkly deteriorated in both quantity and
quality across a variety of measures. At the same time that we have seen the
risks of a real-world rise in executive and legislative branch attacks on the
press,11 our study finds that the U.S. Supreme Court is not pushing back. These
important findings provide significant evidence that the press’s legal standing
may be on dangerously shaky ground.
As an initial matter, our data show that the Court references the press far
less frequently than it did a half century ago. This includes a notable decline
even in the Court’s most basic recognitions of the work performed by journalists
as communicators of information to the American public. We likewise find that
the Justices today are acknowledging the bare existence of a constitutional right
to “freedom of the press” significantly less often than in prior eras. In fact, the
modern Supreme Court is increasingly less likely to talk about the press or press
freedom at all, regardless of the context for the discussion.
Our data also reveal a parallel decline in the overall tone the Court uses to
characterize the press. Once again, regardless of how or why the Justices are
discussing the news media, the percentage of their references to the press that
are positive has decreased notably over the last several decades. In other words,
the Court is not just talking about the press far less often; when it does talk
about the press, it is doing so in more negative ways.
Analysis of our findings provides valuable insights into the Court’s more
specific depictions of the press and shows the concrete ways those depictions
have changed over time. When our tonal data is investigated against the
backdrop of our specific press-characterization frames, powerful subtrends
emerge—all pointing in the direction of a U.S. Supreme Court with a decreased
respect for the press and a diminished opinion of its value. The Court’s use of
frames that are typically employed positively, such as those tracking the Court’s
references to press freedom’s historic role or the press’s effect on democracy, is
on the decline. At the same time, the frames that tend to skew toward negative
characterizations, like the frame recording the Court’s discussions of the press’s
impact on individual privacy and reputation, not only comprise a higher
percentage of the Court’s more recent press mentions, but also are even more
likely than before to carry a negative tone.
Finally, by combining our findings with information available through the
Supreme Court Database, we were able to analyze each individual Justice’s press
references. We used this collective data to assign each Justice a “Press Support
Score” based on the frequency and tone of his or her press mentions and to
identify the most and least press-friendly Justices throughout history.
In Part I of this Article, we provide an overview of the limitations of prior
scholarly research about the Court’s views of the press and press freedom and
11. See sources cited supra note 1.
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explain why a large-scale empirical investigation of the Court’s characterization
of the press was needed. In Part II, we outline the methodology of our study.
Our findings follow, with an examination in Part III of the decline in both the
frequency and tone of the Court’s press references. In Part IV, we compare
individual Justices’ views of the press, identifying the most and least pressfriendly Justices of all time and discussing potential emerging patterns among
the Court’s current Justices.
All told, our data suggest that any hopes that the judiciary can be trusted
to be a savior of press freedom in America might be misplaced. Indeed, our
empirical analysis of the Court’s characterizations of the press over time
suggests just the opposite. The U.S. Supreme Court is giving less consideration
and regard to the press and its freedom than it did a generation ago, and it
appears unlikely that this trend will reverse in the coming years.
I. LIMITED RESEARCH ON THE COURT’S VIEW OF THE PRESS
Fully capturing the U.S. Supreme Court’s view of the press is a tricky
endeavor. This is largely because, when considering the substantive protection
of expressive freedoms under modern First Amendment doctrine, the Court
focuses almost exclusively on speech rights and not on press freedom. While
the First Amendment includes explicit textual protections for both the
“freedom of speech” and the “freedom of the press,”12 the Court has decided
almost all of the press’s legal rights through the lens of general free speech rights
for all speakers—not as press-specific rulings.13 In fact, the Court today
recognizes virtually no independent right or protection as arising solely from
the Press Clause.14 This has been true even when the Justices have decided cases
where members of the news media were litigants, the rights at issue were ones
12. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
13. See David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REV. 429, 430 (2002) [hereinafter
Anderson, Freedom of the Press] (“[A]s a matter of positive law, the Press Clause actually plays a rather
minor role in protecting the freedom of the press.”); C. Edwin Baker, The Independent Significance of
the Press Clause Under Existing Law, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 955, 956 (2007) (“[T]he Court has never
explicitly recognized that the Press Clause involves any significant content different from that provided
to all individuals by the prohibition on abridging freedom of speech.”); David A. Anderson, Freedom
of the Press in Wartime, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 49, 70 (2006) (explaining that the Court’s cases reveal an
“abandonment of the Press Clause as a specific source of constitutional authority” as “the Court gave
the press whatever rights it recognized under the Speech Clause”); Erik Ugland, Newsgathering,
Autonomy, and the Special-Rights Apocrypha: Supreme Court and Media Litigant Conceptions of Press
Freedom, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 375, 393 (2009) (observing that the Supreme Court has not “declared
that the Press Clause has any meaning apart from the Speech Clause”); Elisabeth Zoller, The United
States Supreme Court and the Freedom of Expression, 84 IND. L.J. 885, 886 (2009) (“Freedom of speech
and freedom of the press are so united in American culture today that, in practice, the Court makes
almost no distinction between the two.”); West, Awakening Press, supra note 6, at 1028 (“The Supreme
Court occasionally offers up rhetoric on the value of the free press, but it steadfastly refuses to explicitly
recognize any right or protection as emanating solely from the Press Clause.” (footnotes omitted)).
14. See Baker, supra note 13, at 956.
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most commonly used by the press, or the legal analysis centered on the unique
functions of the press.15 In these cases, the Court’s ultimate holding almost
always has been a broader one that applies to all speakers (not just the press)
and is part of a sweeping right of free expression (not just freedom of the
press).16
This does not mean, however, that the Justices have not expressed views
about the importance of the free press.17 To the contrary, they have often
written about the value of the press and of press freedom.18 But rather than
recognizing explicit rights and protections for the press, the Justices turned to
nonbinding dicta as the primary means of expressing their views.19 These
insights into the Court’s attitudes toward the press have appeared in a variety
of forms. Sometimes the Justices engaged in long and specific expositions
about the press,20 while other times the references were shorter and more
15. See Sonja R. West, The Stealth Press Clause, 48 GA. L. REV. 729, 736–46 (2014) [hereinafter
West, Stealth Clause] (discussing cases where the holdings applied broadly, but the Court’s analysis
focused on the press and press issues).
16. See West, Awakening Press, supra note 6, at 1036 (“While there are many cases that are often
hailed as important press cases because the primary beneficiaries were journalists, the Court in these
cases actually based its decisions on the Speech Clause or the freedom of expression and awarded rights
or protections to everyone.”).
17. See RonNell Andersen Jones, What the Supreme Court Thinks of the Press and Why It Matters, 66
ALA. L. REV. 253, 254–55 (2014) [hereinafter Jones, What the Supreme Court Thinks] (discussing the
“press-praising language” in Court opinions); West, Stealth Clause, supra note 15, at 731 (explaining that
the Court has “recognized the press as constitutionally unique from nonpress speakers”).
18. See, e.g., Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 548 (1976) (quoting Thomas Jefferson as
writing that “[o]ur liberty depends on the freedom of the press, and that cannot be limited without
being lost”); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966) (praising the media’s “impressive record
of service over several centuries,” observing that “[t]he press does not simply publish information about
trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice,” and stating that a “responsible press has always
been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration”); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S.
374, 389 (1967) (stating that the press performs an “indispensable service . . . in a free society”); Estes
v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965) (“The free press has been a mighty catalyst in awakening public
interest in governmental affairs, exposing corruption among public officers and employees and
generally informing the citizenry of public events and occurrences, including court proceedings.”);
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966) (“[T]he press serves and was designed to serve as a powerful
antidote to any abuses of power by governmental officials and as a constitutionally chosen means for
keeping officials elected by the people responsible to all the people whom they were selected to serve.”).
19. See Jones, Dangerous Dicta, supra note 7, at 706–08; see also West, Stealth Clause, supra note 15,
at 731–32.
20. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J., concurring)
(“In the First Amendment the Founding Fathers gave the free press the protection it must have to
fulfill its essential role in our democracy. The press was to serve the governed, not the governors. The
Government’s power to censor the press was abolished so that the press would remain forever free to
censure the Government. The press was protected so that it could bare the secrets of government and
inform the people. Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in government.
And paramount among the responsibilities of a free press is the duty to prevent any part of the
government from deceiving the people and sending them off to distant lands to die of foreign fevers
and foreign shot and shell. In my view, far from deserving condemnation for their courageous
reporting, the New York Times, the Washington Post, and other newspapers should be commended
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implicit.21 There are even occasions where an insight into a Justice’s perspective
on the press can be gleaned from a mere word choice in his or her description
of the facts of the case.22
When it comes to press freedom, therefore, the Court has not followed its
typical path of protecting constitutional rights through direct explanations and
substantive holdings. Instead, it has lumped members of the press together with
other types of speakers, cast aside unique press freedom issues, and relied
heavily on indirect praise rather than explicit protection. Thus, many of the
press’s claims of unique constitutional standing and a protected societal role—
and much of the wider judiciary’s scaffolding for approaching cases with press
specialness in mind—hinge not on substantive law, but on the Justices’
rhetoric.23 This makes an investigation of the linguistic patterns of the Court’s
press depictions particularly important.
Some might argue, however, that these are merely distinctions without
differences because the press is amply protected as long as First Amendment
doctrine broadly secures expressive rights more generally. To be sure, it is
hardly the case that the press has been left without constitutional protection.
Members of the press, for example, enjoy the same robust speech rights as all
speakers, including crucial protections against threats like prior restraints,24
content-based regulations,25 and overly broad or vague regulations of speech.26
But it is both shortsighted and precarious to assume that the press is adequately
protected by a one-size-fits-all approach to broader expressive freedoms.27
Members of the press are different from other types of speakers in both the
protections they need to do their work effectively28 and the kinds of threats they

for serving the purpose that the Founding Fathers saw so clearly. In revealing the workings of
government that led to the Vietnam war, the newspapers nobly did precisely that which the Founders
hoped and trusted they would do.”).
21. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 467 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting) (describing the
media as “irresistibly drawn to the sight of persons who are visibly in grief”).
22. See, e.g., Marcello v. United States, 400 U.S. 1208, 1209 (1970) (describing press coverage of
the arrival of a prominent figure at the airport by stating that “the press swarmed” the passenger).
23. See Jones, Dangerous Dicta, supra note 7, at 720; see also West, Stealth Clause, supra note 15, at
731–32.
24. See N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714 (rejecting the federal government’s effort to enjoin
newspapers from publishing the contents of a classified study because it constituted an unconstitutional
prior restraint).
25. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015) (describing the scope of the First
Amendment’s prohibition on content-based regulation of speech).
26. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611–12 (1973) (setting forth the First Amendment
overbreadth doctrine).
27. See Sonja R. West, The Majoritarian Press Clause, 2020 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 311, 325 [hereinafter
West, Majoritarian Clause] (discussing the harms in viewing press freedom as merely an extension of
individual expressive freedoms).
28. See Sonja R. West, Press Exceptionalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2434, 2446 (2014) [hereinafter
West, Press Exceptionalism] (noting the press’s needs in the context of newsgathering).
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face from potential government interference.29 In fact, through its discussions
of the press, the Court itself has acknowledged that the press is distinct because
it fulfills specific constitutional functions—gathering and disseminating
information about matters of public concern and serving as a government
watchdog.30 While the Court has often been reluctant to declare overt rights for
the press, it has nonetheless recognized the inherent value of the free press.31
These recognitions, moreover, underlie key rights that are held by both the
press and the public.32 In fact, positive characterizations of the press and the
press function have often been central to the Court’s expansive conception of
these broadly shared rights.33
In other words, past Justices, through their press-praising dicta, have
crafted a vital support structure that bolsters the press’s constitutional status.
This structure, however, will only remain strong if the principles behind the
Justices’ characterizations are repeated, amplified, and reaffirmed by their
successors on the bench. The Court’s indirect approach to press freedom means
that, when it comes to constitutional protection for the press, the Justices’ words
matter. And if this rhetoric were to shift over time, either in framing or in tone,
it could have significant consequences for the press. Understanding the arc of
the Court’s attitude toward the press, therefore, is a vital tool for determining
the strength of press freedom’s constitutional status.
Yet past scholarly research about the Supreme Court’s stance on the press
and on press freedom has typically involved investigation into the smaller
collection of cases where either a news organization was a party or the Court
reached holdings that members of the news media widely rely upon. The
general consensus among scholars following this approach is that the Court’s
29. See id. at 2446–47 (detailing the unique concerns of the press); see also RonNell Andersen
Jones, Press Speakers and the First Amendment Rights of Listeners, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 499, 543–47 (2019)
(examining the unique risks of governmental targeting of the press as an institutional speaker).
30. See West, Stealth Clause, supra note 15, at 750 (compiling Supreme Court precedent
establishing that the press fulfills two unique constitutional functions: “(1) gathering and disseminating
news to the public and (2) providing a check on the government and the powerful”).
31. See id. at 736 (“While the Court has been claiming to treat the public and press alike, there
has been a constitutional principle at work in the background . . . [that] has consistently shown that the
press is constitutionally unique.”).
32. See West, Majoritarian Clause, supra note 27, at 322 (asserting that “our failure to recognize
the right for the press harms our collective interest in a well-informed populace and a monitored
government”); see also RonNell Andersen Jones, Litigation, Legislation, and Democracy in a PostNewspaper America, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 557, 571 (2011) [hereinafter Jones, Litigation, Legislation,
and Democracy] (“A sizable amount of vital constitutional doctrine in this country developed as a result
of constitutional cases in which mainstream media companies, often newspapers, aggressively fought
for fundamental democratic principles that had public benefits beyond the scope of the individual
[press] litigants’ successes.”).
33. See Jones, What the Supreme Court Thinks, supra note 17, at 269, 271 (highlighting “how
thoroughly connected the Court’s positive conception of the media has been to the development of
wider First Amendment doctrine in this country,” and noting evidence that diminished “press
characterization could threaten to impoverish a much wider body of First Amendment rights”).
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tenor toward the press has been on the decline over the past fifty years, after
hitting a high point in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s—sometimes referred to as
the “Glory Days.”34 During these decades, the Court handed down rulings in a
number of important and high-profile cases that greatly favored the news media
(even if the holdings themselves applied more broadly). In New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan35 and its progeny,36 for example, the Court expanded protection for
speakers against defamation lawsuits.37 The Court also decided a number of key
cases opening up access to judicial proceedings, including Richmond Newspapers
v. Virginia38 and the Press-Enterprise cases.39 It was also during this period that
the Court secured the protection of speakers against governmental prior
restraints, such as in New York Times Co. v. United States (the “Pentagon Papers”
case).40 In a series of additional rulings, the Court protected the press from
liability when it published truthful information on matters of public concern41
and protected the press’s freedom of editorial decision-making.42
However, media law scholars have made anecdotal observations that the
Court’s view of the press has been declining over the last several decades, both
in the number of press cases it is hearing and the way it discusses the role of the

34. See id. at 256 (observing the “Glory Days” in which “the Court went out of its way to speak
of the press and then offered effusively complimentary depictions of the media in its opinions”); see
also Erin C. Carroll, Promoting Journalism as Method, 12 DREXEL L. REV. 691, 696 (2020) (“To the
extent that the Supreme Court has seemed to defer to the press, it did so in the mid-twentieth
century—a period that was, relative to today, a golden age.”); David L. Hudson Jr., First Amendment
Free Speech Cases May Turn into Blockbusters, ABA J., Oct. 2000, at 30, 30 (quoting Professor Jane Kirtley
as “recall[ing] with fondness ‘the glory days of the 1970s and ‘80s, when the U.S. Supreme Court
elevated the press clause of the First Amendment to new levels’”).
35. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
36. See, e.g., Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967) (holding that a public figure can
recover damages for defamation, but only after meeting a high burden); Hustler Mag. v. Falwell, 485
U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (“[P]ublic figures and public officials may not recover for the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress by reason of publications . . . without showing in addition that the
publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with ‘actual malice.’”).
37. See, e.g., Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 283 (“[T]he Constitution delimits a State’s power to award
damages for libel in actions brought by public officials against critics of their official conduct.”).
38. 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980) (holding that the right to attend criminal trials for both the public
and the press is an implicit right of the Constitution).
39. Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Ct. (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501, 512–13 (1984) (holding
that, broadly speaking, criminal trial proceedings, including voir dire, must be open to the public);
Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Ct. (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1986) (holding that, broadly
speaking, criminal trial proceedings, including preliminary hearings, must be open to the public).
40. 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J., concurring) (asserting that the “press must be left free to
publish news, whatever the source, without censorship, injunctions, or prior restraints”); see also Neb.
Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 567 (1976) (holding that “a whole community cannot be restrained
from discussing a subject intimately affecting life within it”).
41. See, e.g., Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g
Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1979); Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 532 (1989); Okla. Publ’g Co. v.
Dist. Ct., 430 U.S. 308, 310 (1977) (per curiam).
42. See, e.g., Mia. Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
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press.43 In the 2010 case Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,44 for
example, the Court seemingly went out of its way to describe the press as an
institution on the “decline”—saying much of today’s media coverage consists of
“sound bites, talking points, and scripted messages that dominate the 24-hour
news cycle.”45
The task of more precisely tracking the Court’s attitudes toward the press
over time thus faces several obstacles.46 Because of the Court’s practice of
discussing issues of press freedom in indirect ways, scholars cannot accurately
follow the ebb and flow of the Justices’ views by simply counting the news
media’s track record of wins and losses before the Court.47 At the same time,
doctrinal reviews of the Court’s First Amendment docket are similarly lacking
because the Justices often reveal their views on the value of the press in cases
that do not directly involve the news media or expressive freedoms. Any past
attempts to investigate the Court’s attitudes about the press, therefore, were
incomplete. While some scholars might have read the “jurisprudential tea
leaves”48 and spotted broad trends in the Court’s characterization of the press,
these doctrinal examinations were inherently limited in scope.
Our study sets out to fill this gap by undertaking a systematic analysis of
the Court’s views of the press and the press function over time through a largescale empirical examination. At this critical moment for press freedom, only a
43. See, e.g., Jones, What the Supreme Court Thinks, supra note 17, at 255; Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky,
Not a Free Press Court?, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1819, 1821 (observing that the Roberts Court “appears to
see the ‘Fourth Estate’ as little more than a self-serving slogan bandied about by media corporations”).
44. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
45. Id. at 364; see also Jones, What the Supreme Court Thinks, supra note 17, at 261–62.
46. Another enduring difficulty in examining the Court’s view of the press is the effort to
determine who (or what) is (or isn’t) the “press” for legal purposes. Scholars have debated what
definition of the “press” the Court has embraced or should embrace. Should we think of the “press” of
the First Amendment as a technology, an institution, or a profession? See Eugene Volokh, Freedom for
the Press as an Industry, or for the Press as a Technology? From the Framing to Today, 160 U. PA. L. REV.
459, 461–62 (2012); see also Sonja R. West, The “Press,” Then & Now, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 49, 49 (2016);
Ashutosh Bhagwat, Producing Speech, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1029, 1035 (2015). Is being a member
of the press properly determined by who you are or by what you do? See Randall P. Bezanson, Whither
Freedom of the Press?, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1259, 1260 (2012); see also Michael W. McConnell, Reconsidering
Citizens United as a Press Clause Case, 123 YALE L.J. 412, 412 (2013); West, Press Exceptionalism, supra
note 28, at 2436. How does this definition change (or not change) as the methods of communication
among members of the public or between the government and the people evolve? See Patrick J. Charles
& Kevin Francis O’Neill, Saving the Press Clause from Ruin: The Customary Origins of a “Free Press” as
Interface to the Present and Future, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1691, 1770. As discussed in more detail in Part
II, this study’s methodology was designed to capture the performance of the press function no matter
who was performing it, by capturing acts of “journalism,” “news,” and “reporting” as identified by the
Court itself. In recent cases, this included acts of so-called “citizen journalism,” performed using new
media technologies and not by traditional legacy media organizations.
47. Cf. Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, How Business Fares in the Supreme
Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431, 1433 (2013) (analyzing how “pro-business” the Supreme Court has been
over time by tracking whether the Justices ruled for or against a business litigant).
48. Lidsky, supra note 43, at 1820.
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study of this scope and scale can adequately assess the judicial temperament
toward the press and provide a thoughtful starting point for comparing the
judiciary’s changing view of the press to similar observable trends in the
executive and legislative branches.
II. METHODOLOGY
Our study consists of a systematic content analysis of all press mentions
authored by U.S. Supreme Court Justices and published in the U.S. Reports
from 1784 through July 2020, when the October 2019 Term was completed.49
The studied text set includes all majority, dissenting, and concurring opinions,
as well as all other writings by individual Justices appearing in the U.S. Reports,
including dissents from denial of certiorari and statements associated with
recusal decisions and stay applications.
The goal was to capture all references to the press in its journalistic role,
to commonly understood press functions, and to the constitutional right of press
freedom—no matter how those references appeared. Because the press and
those performing the press function are referred to by a variety of names, we
conducted initial research of opinions across time and assembled a list of the
terms and phrases most often used as synonyms for the press or primary press
behaviors. In some older cases, these included terms that were unique to
particular eras but have since fallen out of use, such as “newspaperman”50 and
“newsmen.”51 In more recent years, with a changing and at times more
decentralized media ecosystem, it included terms that captured the performance
of the newsgathering and reporting functions by entities other than traditional
media outlets, such as references to a “citizen journalist.”52 In all instances, we
made these determinations by tracking the Justices’ own identifications of when
they perceived that the press function was occurring. To create a database with
this scope of press-identifying language, we then conducted a broadly drawn
Westlaw search for a total of nineteen linguistic terms.53 Opinions that
49. See Data on Press Mentions by the Supreme Court, supra note 10. Notably, the first such press
reference did not occur until 1821.
50. See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 798 (1978) (Burger, J., concurring);
Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 311 (1967); In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 655 (1959)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
51. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 667 (1972); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 830
(1974); Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 847 (1974); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 355
(1966); In re Roche, 448 U.S. 1312, 1314 (1980).
52. See, e.g., Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1740 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (discussing
a hypothetical individual recording a police encounter on a cell phone camera and streaming to social
media followers as a “citizen journalist”).
53. The specific search syntax was as follows (without the leading and ending quotation marks):
“adv: OPINION(#press or media or newspaper or “fourth estate” or journalis! or reporter or
newspaperman or newsman or pressman or (news /2 (gather! or magazine or outlet or organization or
service or coverage or article or story or cycle or broadcast!))).”
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contained only uses of these terms in a nonjournalistic sense54 were removed
from the set as false hits. We downloaded the remaining text files and used an
R script to create packets for coders.55 Coders assessed whether each individual
hit was a real hit and, if so, coded the paragraph.56
From this full set, which included more than five thousand presscharacterizing paragraphs, coders systematically coded each reference for the
presence of eight common press-related thematic content frames: the propriety
of regulating the press (the “Regulation Frame”); the press’s effect on
government and democracy (the “Democracy Frame”); the press’s historical
value to the Founders (the “History Frame”); the press’s use as a public
communication mechanism (the “Communication Frame”); the press’s
influence on the judicial system (the “Judicial System Frame”); the press’s
impact on individuals’ reputations and privacy (the “Individuals Frame”); the
constitutional right of press freedom (the “Right Frame”); and the press’s
trustworthiness and ethics (the “Trustworthiness Frame”). Paragraphs could—
and, in many instances, did—contain multiple frames.
Each thematic content frame was then coded for affective tone—that is,
whether the individual frame was conveyed with a positive, negative, or neutral

54. For example, these phrases included “court reporter,” Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508
U.S. 429, 430 (1993), Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 228–29 (1971); “Reporter of Decisions,”
Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1498, 1506 (2020); “may press charges,” Wilkie v.
Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 557 (2007); “dry cleaning press,” Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S.
159, 161 (1995), Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 212 (2000); or “media of
expression,” Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1012 (2017). We also
removed as false hits paragraphs that included the specified terms only in case names or titles of books
and other material cited by the authoring Justice, see, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
382 (1974) (White, J., dissenting) (including the following string citation: “See generally L. Levy,
Legacy of Suppression: Freedom of Speech and Press in Early American History 247–48 (1960);
Merin, Libel and the Supreme Court, 11 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 371, 376 (1969); Hallen, Fair Comment,
8 Tex. L. Rev. 41, 56 (1929)”), or that made true reference to the press as a noun, but in a
noncharacterizing way that could be replaced with other, nonjournalistic nouns, see, e.g., Lewis v.
Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 767 (1990) (“After three days, when the body began to smell, respondent and
Van Der Veer wrapped the body in newspaper and plastic garbage bags, placed it in a sleeping bag, and
transported it to a secluded area, where they buried it in a shallow grave.”).
55. A script is a file of code to be executed in R, which is a programming language and
environment “for statistical computing and graphics.” See The R Project for Statistical Computing, R
FOUND., https://www.r-project.org [https://perma.cc/YH7V-VZQP]. Our script divided up the full
opinion texts into smaller files for the coders to evaluate. Paragraphs were randomly shuffled for coder
review of every hit—such that paragraphs from earlier and later periods in the chronological dataset
were mixed and multiple paragraphs from a single opinion were not presented seriatim—so as to avoid
any possible acclimation effects that might arise from a coder working within a particular opinion or
era. Each packet included the paragraph containing the search hit and the paragraph above and below
it. We did this to provide some context to the coders working in randomly sorted coding packets.
56. Coded characterizations included the Justices’ original characterizations, as well as
characterizations made by others that the Justices repeated in their writings.
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connotation.57 For example, if a paragraph referenced the press’s
trustworthiness, reliability, professionalism, or ethics in any way, it was coded
as containing the Trustworthiness Frame. If the reference stated or suggested
that the press behaves in a trustworthy manner, the tone was coded as positive.
If the reference indicated that the press behaves in an untrustworthy manner,
the tone was coded as negative.58 If the reference noted the existence of a debate
over the trustworthiness of the press without taking a position, the tone was
coded as neutral.
Post-coding analysis merged the paragraphs with the Supreme Court
Database, which allowed Justice- and case-level examination of results,59
including analysis of each press reference by Court Term, the Justices who
authored the opinion, and the case topic area.60
Importantly, this approach captured every time the Court engaged in a
characterization of the press, not just those cases in which the press was a party
or press freedom was expressly at issue. We sought to explore how the Justices
have depicted the press overall and to portray the full scope of their depictions
over time. Thus, as shown in Figure 1, the dataset includes instances in which
the Court primarily addressed some other matter—a criminal law or antitrust
issue, for example—but took a moment in passing to say something about the
press or to situate the press’s role in society.

57. Coders worked from a detailed codebook (on file with the authors and available upon request),
received twenty-five hours of substantive training on identification of frame and tone, and performed
nine rounds of beta testing on practice batches of paragraphs. We also iteratively revised the codebook
itself in instances where our initial protocols had been unclear or yielded coding results that were
unreliable across the coders. Intercoder agreement was +95% on thematic frame content and +90% on
affective tone.
58. The coding scheme allowed for each unique paragraph-frame combination to take on each of
the possible tone values. A single paragraph could, for example, be coded with both a positive
Trustworthiness Frame and a negative Trustworthiness Frame if the authoring Justice characterized
the press both ways within the paragraph.
59. See WASH. U. L. SUP. CT. DATABASE, http://scdb.wustl.edu/ [https://perma.cc/VJA8UEJQ] (“The Database contains over two hundred pieces of information about each case decided by
the Court between the 1791 and 2019 terms[,] . . . includ[ing] the identity of the court whose decision
the Supreme Court reviewed, the parties to the suit, the legal provisions considered in the case, and
the votes of the Justices.”). The database provides two datasets, one including data from 1946 to 2020,
MODERN Database: 2021 Release 01, WASH. U. L. SUP. CT. DATABASE, http://scdb.wustl.edu/
data.php [https://perma.cc/YH23-YHTN] (Sept. 30, 2021), and the other providing data from 1791 to
1945, LEGACY Database: SCDB Legacy 07, WASH. U. L. SUP. CT. DATABASE, http://scdb.wustl.edu/
data.php?s=6 [https://perma.cc/N8DD-7ZCM] (Oct. 1, 2021).
60. In a small number of cases, non-opinion materials included within the studied set—for
example, dissents from denial of certiorari or published statements on recusal—were not found within
the Supreme Court Database. In these instances, the relevant information, such as authoring Justice,
Term of publication, and the Supreme Court issue (as defined by the detailed Supreme Court Database
Codebook) was added manually to the dataset. See Online Code Book, WASH. U. L. SUP. CT.
DATABASE, http://scdb.wustl.edu/documentation.php?s=1 [https://perma.cc/QBT6-GWHY].
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Figure 1. Distribution of Press Mentions Among Issue Areas

We discovered that these press-characterizing “asides” occur with some
frequency and often convey core assumptions about the press. Sometimes they
are positive, like when the Court offhandedly praises an act of newsgathering
as socially beneficial or casually mentions freedom of the press as a critically
important value when listing such values in a case focused on another
constitutionally protected liberty.61 Sometimes they are negative, for example,
when the Court describes the tendency of news coverage to be sensational62 or
invasive of privacy.63 Other times they are neutral, like when the Court merely
notes the existence of the press’s function of distributing information to the
public by mentioning the existence of a newspaper story in the facts of an
opinion.64 By coding both doctrinal and nondoctrinal depictions of the press,

61. See, e.g., Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 680 (1944) (Murphy, J., concurring)
(“The naturalized citizen has as much right as the natural-born citizen to exercise the cherished
freedoms of speech, press and religion . . . .”).
62. See, e.g., Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 541 (1990) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the Court’s opinion on abortion rights is likely “to further incite [the]
American press”); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 384 (1976) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“Despite the
importance of elective offices to the ongoing work of local governments, election campaigns for lesser
offices in particular usually attract little attention from the media . . . .”).
63. See, e.g., Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2254 (2019) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(“[P]erhaps the Court granted certiorari because the case has received a fair amount of media
attention. . . . Media attention can produce . . . dangers, . . . including discouraging reluctant witnesses
from testifying and encouraging eager witnesses, prosecutors, defense counsel, and even judges to
perform for the audience.”).
64. See, e.g., Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 93 (1972) (“Seeing a newspaper
announcement of the new ordinance, Mosley contacted the Chicago Police Department to find out
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this study captures the full picture of the universe of press characterizations
over the course of the Supreme Court’s history.
The data summarized below include 5,267 coder-reviewed paragraphs
from 1,296 unique cases, containing 8,840 total characterizations of the press.65
III. A WANING PERCEPTION OF THE FREE PRESS
The most notable trend across all categories of gathered data in this study
is that the U.S. Supreme Court’s characterizations of the press are starkly
declining in both quantity and quality. The Court makes far fewer references
to the press and its role in society than it did at the height of the Glory Days.
When the Court does talk about the press, moreover, it does so in increasingly
negative ways.
A.

Decreased References to the Press and Press Freedom

Through an investigation of the frequency of press references, we find that
the Court acknowledges both the existence of journalism in American society
and the bare notion of a “freedom of the press” much less often than it did a
half century ago. Today’s Court, in other words, is far less likely to talk about
the press or press freedom in any context. As discussed above, a significant
portion of the press’s constitutional status has its roots in the Justices’
nonbinding discussion of its work—as opposed to coming from substantive legal
holdings.66 Thus, in light of the press’s unusual reliance on the Court’s
continued recognition of its various roles, this drop in the frequency of press
references might be a reason for concern.
Figure 2 shows the overall frequency of coded mentions across time. Since
the late 1970s, the incidence of press references has steeply declined. The
number of cases that the Court has heard per Term decreased during this same
period,67 which may account for some of this decline. Because the unit of
analysis for this study is the paragraph, however, the impact of fewer cases per
Term is significantly tempered by substantial increases in overall opinion length
and a clear uptick in the practice of individual Justices writing separate
how the ordinance would affect him; he was told that, if his picketing continued, he would be
arrested.”).
65. Each frame-tone combination is treated as an individual mention. If a paragraph contained
multiple frames—or multiple tonal depictions of a single frame—all were coded individually.
66. See supra Part I.
67. Federal Judicial Caseloads, 1789–2016: Supreme Court of the United States Petitions Granted, 1970–
2015, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/exhibits/graphs-and-maps/supreme-court-case
loads-1880-2015 [https://perma.cc/LA2D-SND9] (showing the number of granted Supreme Court
petitions peaking in 1981 and steadily declining since); see also Supreme Court Cases, October Term 2019–
2020, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Supreme_Court_cases,_October_term_2019-2020 [https
://perma.cc/8ZWN-79HD] (“The court issued decisions in 63 cases this [2019] term. Between the 2007
and 2019 terms, SCOTUS released opinions in 991 cases, averaging 76 cases per year.”).
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opinions.68 Frequency comparisons might also be impacted by the fact that the
Court agreed to hear many more cases in the 1960s and 1970s that were
specifically focused on the press or press rights.69 Although these changes do
complicate contrasts between the low-frequency current Court and the highfrequency Court a half-century ago, they indicate trends that illustrate rather
than undermine the theme identified here: that the Court has largely lost
interest in speaking about the press.
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Figure 2. Total Number of Press Mentions Over Time

This trend holds true for every studied frame. For example, the Court’s
references characterizing the press within the Regulation Frame, which captures
the Justices’ views on the news media’s power and the appropriateness of
government regulation of the press, peak in the 1970s and drop off precipitously

68. See Adam Liptak, Justices Are Long on Words but Short on Guidance, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17,
2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/18/us/18rulings.html#:~:text=The%20lengths%20of%20deci
sions%2C%20including,a%20record%2C%20at%208%2C265%20words [https://perma.cc/29MN-D43
Y (dark archive)] (noting that in the 2009 Term, there was “at least one concurring opinion in 77
percent of unanimous rulings” and that, while Brown v. Board of Education in 1954 had fewer than 4,000
words, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission in 2010 had 48,000, “about the length of ‘The
Great Gatsby’”).
69. This can be seen in several aspects of our data. Notably, the data show that a higher proportion
of press-characterizing paragraphs from that era are found in cases that the Supreme Court Database
codes as First Amendment cases. Our data likewise show many more press-characterizing paragraphs
per opinion in the 1970s, which might be expected of cases squarely dealing with press-related issues.
For example, from 1975 to 1979, there were some cases with forty-five or more press-characterizing
paragraphs in a single opinion. Since 2015, no case has had more than ten.
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after that, diminishing to nearly zero in recent years.70 Characterizations of the
press’s effect on democratic government, its influence on the judicial system,
its impact on individuals’ reputations and privacy, its trustworthiness and
ethics, and its value to the Founders all similarly plummeted. Indeed, it appears
that the U.S. Supreme Court has, in effect, stopped making even the most
casual references to the press and its operation in society. The Communication
Frame captured all textual references in which the Court merely acknowledged
or implied that journalism is how information is dispersed or becomes widely
known by the population, as well as any mentions of the gathering, reporting,
and editing of news. Yet even these most basic nods to the press function have
ebbed in recent years.71 That is, as a practical matter, today’s Court is erasing
the work of the press from its public discourse.
The “freedom of the press,” moreover, has also dropped out of the U.S.
Supreme Court’s collective vocabulary. The data show that a generation ago,
the Court routinely acknowledged press freedom as a First Amendment right
worthy of mention, yet today it does not. The Right Frame, which was coded
every time the Court made any reference to rights-recognizing language like
“freedom of the press,” “the liberty of the press,” or “the right of a free press,”
hit its crest in the 1970s. Since then, usage of this language has declined so
thoroughly that many recent Terms make no reference to it at all.72 This decline
appears not to be exclusively, or even primarily, due to a reduced caseload of
press-focused cases. Many of the references at the height of the Court’s usage
of this frame came by way of inclusion of “freedom of the press” in something
of a laundry list of important values not at issue in the particular case73 or in the
Court’s inclusive use of the First Amendment language “freedom of speech or
of the press” in cases that were focused on speech rights.74 That practice has
ceased, and the Court now eschews reference to the press component of the

70. At the Regulation Frame’s peak in 1973, there were 156 characterizations of it in a single Term
that fit within that frame. The combined total references to the frame in the most recent five Terms
are just twenty-four.
71. At its height, the Court was using this frame sixty times in a single Term (1971)—nearly twice
as many times as it has invoked the frame in the most recent five Terms combined (thirty-one times).
72. For further investigation of this data and its theoretical and practical ramifications, see
generally RonNell Andersen Jones & Sonja R. West, The Disappearing Freedom of the Press, WASH. &
LEE L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 24–39).
73. See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (noting, in an
expressive freedom case, the right to “a free press”); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S.
449, 461 (1958) (describing, in a freedom of association case, the “indispensable liberties . . . of speech,
press, or association”); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 492 (1961) (suggesting, in a religious freedom
case, that the First Amendment “broke new constitutional ground in the protection it sought to afford
to freedom of religion, speech, press, petition and assembly”).
74. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937); see also Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S.
444, 450 (1938); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S.
88, 97 (1940).
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right. Rhetorically, the freedom of the press as a specified, recognizable liberty
has all but disappeared.
A radically declining incidence of Supreme Court attention to the press—
like most issues related to the press in American society today—is a “wicked
problem,”75 as both the scope of causation and the array of practical
ramifications are complicated by the existence of other simultaneously
occurring phenomena. This changing behavior by the Court is, of course,
happening alongside a changing media landscape, a changing public, a changing
economy, and a changing political environment. The Court’s choice to shy away
from its once-frequent pattern of judicial characterization of the press surely
cannot be divorced from other factors, including evolving mass communication
technology and the strategic decisions made by the news media to avoid
bringing cases to the Court because of limited finances76 or limited confidence
in positive outcomes.77 This confluence of factors may prove complicated to
unpack. But the Court’s choices unquestionably matter, as well. The U.S.
Supreme Court has a heavy influence in shaping the environment for the
exercise of rights and has historically been a source of significant public
narrative about the role the press plays in society. That it has fallen silent on
this front—and that it has virtually ceased to give voice to even the bare
existence of an American freedom of the press—is an important component of
the wider conversation on the future of the media.
B.

A Sharp Decline in Tone

Notably, a parallel and concerning trend demonstrates an unambiguous
decline in the tone the U.S. Supreme Court uses to characterize the press. In
other words, our data show not only that the Justices are talking about the press
less often but also that, when they do, they are adopting more negative tones.
In the last fifty years, the Court’s view of the news media has deteriorated
across a variety of measures. Overall tone data, depicted in Figures 3 and 4,
show positivity of press characterization peaking sharply in the 1970s and
declining in the years since. Indeed, a Supreme Court reference to the press a
generation ago was nearly twice as likely to be characterized positively as a
reference from today’s Court.78

75. MARTHA MINOW, SAVING THE NEWS: WHY THE CONSTITUTION CALLS FOR
GOVERNMENT ACTION TO PRESERVE FREEDOM OF SPEECH 101 (2021) (defining a “wicked
problem” as one “with multiple interacting causes and no single solution”).
76. See Jones, Litigation, Legislation, and Democracy, supra note 32, at 617–19 (addressing the
financial decline of the newspaper industry and its impact on constitutional litigation).
77. We note, however, that the data shows a decline in press references across the board and not
just a decline in cases in which the press is a party.
78. The relative frequency of positive references in the 1970 to 1984 Terms was 35%, and 19% in
the 2005 to 2019 Terms.
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This remarkable shift is sharply illustrated through a comparison of two
fifteen-year periods, which are depicted in Figure 5: the first from the Court’s
1970 to 1984 Terms and the second from the 2005 to 2019 Terms.
Figure 5. Comparison of Press Mentions from 1970–1984 and 2005–2019

During the 1970 to 1984 period, there were more positive than negative
mentions in eleven of the fifteen years. As for the other four Terms, two were
split almost identically between positives and negatives (1976 and 1978), and
another had only three more negative references than positive (1980). Only a
single Term (1981) provided even modest evidence of an anti-press slant with
29% of the 129 mentions carrying a negative tone as compared to 17% of
mentions that were positive (although the majority of references were neutral).
In ten of the fifteen Terms, 30% or more of the mentions were positive. In three
of the Terms, positive mentions exceeded 40%.79 Meanwhile, negative mentions
in this period never once reached 30% of the total, and in several Terms, the
percentage of negative mentions was in the teens.80 Notably, this low negativity
rate took place against the backdrop of a staggeringly large number of total
paragraphs referencing the press; the seven Terms with the highest frequency
of press mentions are all within this timeframe.
Conversely, in the most recent fifteen-year period, the Court’s presspositivity rate plummeted to an average of just 19% per Term. In no Term has
it ever exceeded 40% of total references, and in six of the fifteen years, it was
79. The October 1972 Term had 47% positive mentions.
80. The October 1972 Term had 19% negative mentions; the 1979 Term had 11% negative
mentions; the 1982 Term had 18% negative mentions; and the 1983 Term had 15% negative mentions.
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15% or lower. In three Terms (2012, 2015, and 2017) no Justice made any
positive characterization at all in any majority, concurring, or dissenting opinion
or other official writing published in the U.S. Reports. In sharp contrast to a
generation ago, in ten of the fifteen most recent Terms, the number of negative
mentions was equal to or greater than the number of positive mentions. In 2015,
for the first time in history, the number of negative press mentions
outnumbered the combined total of positive and neutral references, with 75%
of references conveying negativity.81
Our data tracking neutrality also reveal a noteworthy shift in tone. In the
earlier of the two fifteen-year blocks, neutral references averaged 43% of the
total. In two of the fifteen years, positive references equaled or outnumbered
neutral references. In the most recent fifteen-year block, however, the average
neutrality rate was around 57%. Neutrality now always exceeds positivity, and
often by large margins. The gravitational pull, therefore, seems to appear on
two fronts—from positive to neutral and from neutral to negative. Ultimately,
the tone-trend analyses in the study run entirely in the direction of reduced
positivity toward the press and the press function. The modern data suggest
that the current Court will engage in a positive characterization of the press
only in the rarest of situations.
When tonal data are investigated against the backdrop of specific frames,
powerful subtrends emerge—all of which also point in the direction of a U.S.
Supreme Court with a decreased respect for and a devalued characterization of
the press. This is evidenced in three major ways.
First, frames that tend to produce positive characterizations from the
Court are on the decline. The data indicate that some frames are
overwhelmingly predictive of a positive tone. For example, the Democracy
Frame captures every instance in which the Court speaks of the press’s impact
on government and other powerful entities or its impact more generally on
democracy, elections, and the functioning of representative government. When
the Court chooses to use this frame, it almost always does so positively—
characterizing the press as a check82 or watchdog83 that creates accountability
and subjects powerful actors or their policies to public scrutiny in ways that are
valuable and beneficial to society. Included within this frame are the many
81. Like many recent Terms, the 2015 Term had an exceptionally low absolute frequency. There
were four total references to the press, three of which were negative, one of which was neutral, and
none of which were positive.
82. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(explaining that the press acts as a vital check which “serves the basic purpose of the First
Amendment”); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569, 580 (1980) (holding that
the First Amendment guarantees the right of the public and press to attend criminal trials as a check
on the government).
83. See, e.g., Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 440 (1991) (explaining that taxes should not
hinder the press’s important role as “a watchdog of government activity”).
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references to the press and its work being “central to a free society,”84 aiding
voters’ decision-making,85 and bringing to light matters of public concern. As
seen in Figures 6 and 7, this positive tone predominates within the frame, while
negative and neutral uses are much rarer. But the frequency data depict how
thoroughly this positive frame has fallen out of use. This frame builds in
occurrence, peaking during the mid-1960s to the early 1980s—an era that maps
onto Watergate, the Pentagon Papers, and a swelling public sense of
journalism’s heroism86—and then drops off significantly during the Rehnquist
and Roberts Courts. The Court is simply not discussing the press through the
lens of its democracy- and accountability-enhancement functions anymore. The
once relatively frequent pattern of briefly mentioning this complementary
characterization of the press as an accountability-enhancing watchdog is largely
a thing of the past.

84. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 407–08 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (explaining that truth in publication is “central to a free society”).
85. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218–19 (1966) (explaining that the First Amendment’s
purpose is to “protect the free discussion of governmental affairs,” including “discussions of candidates,
structures and forms of government, the manner in which government is operated or should be
operated, and all such matters relating to political processes” to create an informed citizenry).
86. See N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 728 (“In the absence of the governmental checks and balances
present in other areas of our national life, the only effective restraint upon executive policy and power
in the areas of national defense and international affairs may lie in an enlightened citizenry—in an
informed and critical public opinion which alone can here protect the values of democratic government.
For this reason, it is perhaps here that a press that is alert, aware, and free most vitally serves the basic
purpose of the First Amendment. For without an informed and free press there cannot be an
enlightened people.”); see also Stephen F. Rohde, Presidential Power vs. Free Press, L.A. LAW., Oct.
2017, at 26, 30 (discussing President Nixon’s relationship and conflicts with the press); Paul Brewer,
The Fourth Estate and the Quest for a Double Edged Shield: Why a Federal Reporters’ Shield Law Would
Violate the First Amendment, 36 U. MEM. L. REV. 1073, 1114 (2006) (stating that “the greater the
connection between the press and elected officials, the greater the decline in journalism,” which could
result in groundbreaking stories, like Watergate, failing to make the front page).
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Figure 6. Mentions of Press Effect on Democracy by Raw Frequency
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Figure 7. Mentions of Press Effect on Democracy as Proportion of Total

Negative

A similar trend is visible in the History Frame, which was coded any time
a Justice mentioned the Founders, the Founding era, or the original intent of
the First Amendment as it pertains to the press. Although the overall number
of total uses is relatively small compared to certain other frames, Figures 8 and
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9 show that positive historical connotations—those suggesting that, as an
originalist matter, the Founders valued, prioritized, and crafted constitutional
provisions with the goal of protecting the press87—overwhelmingly outnumber
negative and neutral references. Again, this frame builds in frequency, peaks in
the 1970s, and then drops off, so much so that it is virtually undetectable in
many of the most recent years of the Roberts Court.88 Staggeringly, in the one
recent Term in which the History Frame does appear, our data show it flipping
to total tonal negativity. All told, it appears that the current Court is outright
abandoning framings of the press that—either as a practical matter or as a
matter of established precedent or rhetorical pattern—are positive in their
depictions. If a particular framing of the press is primarily positive, the Court
now chooses to omit it.

87. See, e.g., Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 151, 153 (1973)
(Douglas, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The sturdy people who fashioned the First Amendment
would be shocked at that intrusion of Government into a field which in this Nation has been reserved
for individuals, whatever part of the spectrum of opinion they represent. . . . But even Thomas
Jefferson, who knew how base and obnoxious the press could be, never dreamed of interfering. For he
thought that government control of newspapers would be the greater of two evils.”); Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 531 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judgment) (“History regards
‘freedom of the press’ as indispensable for a free society and for its government.”); Curtis Publ’g Co.
v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 147 (1967) (discussing “the intent of the Founders who felt that a free press
would advance ‘truth, science, morality, and arts in general,’ as well as responsible government”).
88. From 2008 to 2019, there were just seven such references—three in the October 2009 Term
and four in the October 2018 Term. From the October 2004 Term to 2008 and 2010 to 2017, there
were none at all.

1820-24
1825-29
1830-34
1835-39
1840-44
1845-49
1850-54
1855-59
1860-64
1865-69
1870-74
1875-79
1880-84
1885-89
1890-94
1895-99
1900-04
1905-09
1910-14
1915-19
1920-24
1925-29
1930-34
1935-39
1940-44
1945-49
1950-54
1955-59
1960-64
1965-69
1970-74
1975-79
1980-84
1985-89
1990-94
1995-99
2000-04
2005-09
2010-14
2015-19

0

Proportion of Mentionss
.1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9
1
1820-24
1825-29
1830-34
1835-39
1840-44
1845-49
1850-54
1855-59
1860-64
1865-69
1870-74
1875-79
1880-84
1885-89
1890-94
1895-99
1900-04
1905-09
1910-14
1915-19
1920-24
1925-29
1930-34
1935-39
1940-44
1945-49
1950-54
1955-59
1960-64
1965-69
1970-74
1975-79
1980-84
1985-89
1990-94
1995-99
2000-04
2005-09
2010-14
2015-19

0

10

Number of Mentions
20
30

40

100 N.C. L. REV. 375 (2022)

400
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

Positive

Positive
Neutral

Neutral

[Vol. 100

Figure 8. Mentions of Historical Value of Press by Raw Frequency

Negative

Figure 9. Mentions of Historical Value of Press as Proportion of Total

Negative

Second, and conversely, the frames that are predictors of the Court’s
negativity toward the press are now both appearing more frequently as a
percentage of mentions and showing even stronger intraframe negativity. In
other words, the Justices are turning to these negative-leaning frames more
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often and then using them in a more consistently negative manner. Most
notably, this is happening with the Individuals Frame, which encompasses
references by the Court to the press’s impact on individuals’ privacy interests,
reputational interests, and emotional interests. Perhaps unsurprisingly, given
the existence of legal causes of action for invasion of privacy, defamation, and
infliction of emotional distress, the negative tone appears much more often in
this frame than do the neutral or positive tones. Figures 10 and 11 show these
trends. When the Individuals Frame is invoked, it is usually for the Court to
comment that the press injured (or was a tool used by someone else to injure)
an individual’s privacy, reputation, or emotional well-being. The combined tone
and frequency data show upward negative tone trends and comparatively
stronger frequency over the last half-century.89 At the peak of the Court’s
generous treatment of the press, in the 1970s, the negative Individuals Frame
references were tempered somewhat by neutral ones. Today, that is not the case.
In many recent years, the entire set of Individuals Frame characterizations has
been tonally negative.90 Put another way, although the Roberts Court does not
speak about the press often, when it does, it says that the press is harmful to
people.

89. Ninety-two percent of the Individuals Frame references from 2010 to 2019 were negative;
none were positive. While the Individuals Frame accounts for just 4.2% of references in the total
dataset, it accounts for 7.2% of references from 2015 to 2019. With a large percentage of the current
Justices’ references falling into the neutral Communication Frame—simply noting the existence of the
press as an entity that publishes material for the public—even small increases in the remaining
substantive frames have a meaningful impact on the spread of actual characterizations of the press.
90. The 2010, 2015, and 2018 Terms all referenced the Individuals Frame with only a negative
tone. Between 2010 and 2019, the total tone spread was 92% negative and 8% neutral.
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Figure 10. Mentions of Press Effect on Individuals by Raw Frequency

Negative

Figure 11. Mentions of Press Effect on Individuals as Proportion of Total

Negative

Third, and finally, the tone trend is also seen in data gathered on what we
might term “mixed-tone” frames—content characterizations of the press that
the Court has sometimes portrayed positively and other times negatively. The
Trustworthiness Frame and the Regulation Frame both demonstrate this
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phenomenon. As seen in Figure 12, the Trustworthiness Frame skews negative
overall, but has a mixed-tone history with a distinct upward trajectory of
negativity. From the 1960s to the 1980s, the Court’s references to media
trustworthiness and ethics were far more tonally varied—with many cases
describing the press as a trusted, useful, ethical institution and indicating that
journalism is a source of accurate, dependable information from credible
sources. Figure 13 shows that the more recent cases, from the Rehnquist and
Roberts Courts, chart very little positivity in this frame, with the most recent
years charting none at all. Indeed, there has not been a positive reference to the
trustworthiness of the press from any Justice since 2009.91 Thus, when the Court
is taking the opportunity to opine on the subject, the opinion it now projects is
that the press lacks credibility in some way—for example, by behaving
unethically, providing inaccurate information, or sensationalizing events.

91. A generation ago, the percentage of neutral references in this category was also higher. Thus,
it appears that the Court is shifting negatively and references that would once have been made in a
neutral way now have a negative connotation.
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Figure 12. Mentions of Press Trustworthiness by Raw Frequency
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Figure 13. Mentions of Press Trustworthiness as Proportion of Total
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Similarly, but to a lesser extent, the Regulation Frame shows some
increased negativity in a mixed-tone dynamic. This frame follows the Court’s
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acceptance or rejection of the government’s ability to regulate the press.92
Although positive tones have traditionally outpaced negative ones, this frame
has always been somewhat tonally mixed; even in its most positive historical
years, the Court has recognized a substantial number of situations in which the
press could or should be regulated. As depicted in Figures 14 and 15, there is
also a slight increase in negativity within this frame over time.93

92. For this frame, any reference by the Court suggesting that the government cannot or should
not regulate the press was coded as positive, while any reference suggesting the opposite was coded as
negative.
93. Negativity of Regulation Frame references increased from 14% in 1960–1964 to 33% in 2015–
2019.
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Figure 14. Mentions of Press Protections from Government Regulation
by Raw Frequency

Negative

Figure 15. Mentions of Press Protections from Government Regulation
by Proportion of Total

Negative

On every meaningful measure included within the study—including the
frequency of acknowledgement of the press, the frames selected for
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characterizing the press, and the tone used to depict the press—the modern
Court is significantly less positive than the Court a generation ago. The data
suggest that the press is unlikely to find a receptive audience at the U.S.
Supreme Court anytime soon.94
IV. INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES AND PRESS CHARACTERIZATIONS
Finally, we analyzed our data for comparisons between and among
individual Justices, with the goal of identifying the most and least press-friendly
Justices of all time. The individual Justice data also permit us to better
understand the judicial environment the press currently faces by examining the
press references by the Justices on the modern Court.
A.

Determining the Justices’ Press-Friendliness

As discussed above, two primary factors are important when considering
the Court’s characterizations of the press: frequency and tone.95 The tone of the
Court’s press references, of course, sends a strong message about its
understanding of the press’s value in our society. But how often the Court
mentions the press also affects this message by amplifying (through a high
number of references) or minimizing (through a low number) the impact of
these characterizations. We therefore focus on these same two factors to
examine the relative press-friendliness of the individual Justices.
We first analyzed tone by assigning a “Press Support Score” to every
Justice who authored more than fifty total mentions in the dataset.96 To
calculate the Press Support Score, we looked at how far above or below average
a Justice was on three measures: (1) percent positive characterizations, (2)
percent negative characterizations, and (3) the ratio of positive to negative
characterizations. We then rescaled these scores from zero to one hundred,
assigning the Justice with the highest raw Press Support Score, Justice
Sutherland, a score of one hundred and the Justice with the lowest, Justice
Clark, a score of zero.97
94. As with the frequency data, the tone data situate themselves within a wider, multifaceted
societal and media dynamic. We do not suggest that the Court’s perceptions of the press are the sole
factor in any meaningful consideration of press roles or press rights. But particularly given the
comparatively intense scrutiny afforded to changing press characterizations within the legislative and
executive branches, there are compelling reasons to interrogate the false assumptions that might have
been made about a baseline of positivity from the Court and to explore what the data to the contrary
may mean for the already complicated conversations about the press’s composition, its performance,
and its protection in American society.
95. See supra Part III.
96. This group of Justices is approximately equivalent to the sixtieth percentile. We concluded
that we lacked sufficient data to analyze the positive-to-negative ratios for the Justices whose frequency
of mentions fell below this threshold.
97. Based on their Press Support Scores alone, we found that the second-most positive Justice
was the first Justice Harlan, whose Press Support Score is ninety-five. He is followed by Justice Black
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The ratio of a Justice’s positive to negative references, however, does not
fully capture the influence of a Justice’s discussions about the press. It also
matters how often a Justice chooses to speak about the press, its role in society,
and its value to democracy. Each time a Justice finds an opportunity to
communicate a view of the press, the effect of the Justice’s characterization,
whether positive or negative, is magnified. Therefore, we also ranked each
Justice based on the number of times he or she referenced the press. Our data
show that Justice Brennan was the most frequent commentator on the press,
with 650 mentions.98 On the other end of the spectrum are Justices who ranked
low on the frequency scale, including three who authored only a single
paragraph referencing the press.99 Indeed, 20 of the 114 total Justices to serve
on the Court never once characterized the press.100
Because we limited our Press Support Score ranking pool to Justices who
had more than fifty mentions in our dataset, however, we included only this
same set of Justices for our analysis of the most and least press-friendly
members of the Court. This means that all of the Justices we considered for
these rankings were in roughly the top 40% of Justices based on frequency.
Figure 16 shows how these two factors work together to reveal our most
press-friendly and least press-friendly Justices. In this figure, we plotted the
thirty-nine qualifying Justices based on their frequency of press mentions (xaxis)101 and their Press Support Score (y-axis). The dashed line indicates the
median for each factor. The farther above the median Press Support line a
Justice appears, the more press-friendly he or she is and vice versa. The farther

at ninety-four, Justice Brandeis at ninety-two, and Justice Goldberg at eighty-nine. Justice Frankfurter
is the second most negative Justice with a Press Support Score of eight, followed by Justice Pitney at
fourteen, Justice White at nineteen, and Justice Robert Jackson at twenty-five. Again, we did not
calculate Press Support Scores for Justices who had fifty or fewer paragraphs in our dataset, so these
scores are only among those whose frequency warranted inclusion in that pool.
98. Justice Brennan was followed by Justice White with 629 paragraphs, Justice Douglas with 612,
Justice Burger with 497, and Justice Black with 481.
99. These were Chief Justice Marshall and Justices Samuel Chase and Whittaker.
100. Justice Barrett, the Court’s 115th Justice, was not included in our study. The Court as an
Institution, SUP. CT. U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/institution.aspx [https://perma.cc/T
D8W-VPL2]. The twenty Justices who never characterized the press were Justices Moore; Duvall;
Livingston; Jackson; Campbell; Blair; Byrnes; Iredell; Jay; McKinley; Rutledge, Jr.; Wilson;
Ellsworth; Barbour; Trimble; Chase; T. Johnson; Todd; Cushing; and Paterson. Many of these Justices
served in the 1700s and early 1800s, id., when the issue had not emerged factually and the Court’s
opinions were much more concise. But seven of the twenty Justices penned opinions classified as First
Amendment opinions by the Supreme Court Database.
101. The x-scale presents the natural logarithm of the number of press mentions in our data.
Logging our values removes the skewness in the distribution introduced by the presence of a number
of Justices who mentioned the press especially often in their writings. For example, the minimum in
the graphed data is fifty-one mentions, and the maximum is 650 mentions, which means the discrepancy
between the two raw values is separated by a factor of about thirteen. The logged values are 3.9 and
6.5, respectively, which are separated by a factor of only about 1.7.
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to the right of the median press frequency line a Justice appears, the more often
he or she mentions the press; those to the left are less-frequent commentators.
Figure 16. Most and Least Press-Friendly Justices
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The first quadrant, in the upper-right-hand corner, showing high
frequency and strong Press Support Scores, indicates our most press-friendly
Justices—those who both spoke often about the press and, when they did so,
were more likely to speak positively. We find that the most press-friendly
Justices of all time are Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan. The least pressfriendly Justice—found in the fourth quadrant in the lower-right-hand corner,
with the combination of high frequency and low Press Support Score—is Justice
Byron White.
Several observations stand out about these particular Justices who emerge
as our free-press “heroes” and “villain.” The first is the length of time they
served on the Court. All four Justices are among the longest-serving Justices of
all time—Justice Douglas currently ranks as the longest-serving Justice, Justice
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Black as the fifth, Justice Brennan as the seventh, and Justice White as the
twelfth.102 The length of these Justices’ tenures exposes a limitation of relying
too heavily on the frequency of press mentions alone. The longer a Justice serves
on the Court, of course, the more opportunities he or she had to speak about
the press. Some Justices had exceedingly short stints on the bench103 and others
only recently took their seats,104 which means that their opportunities to
characterize the press were likely not as plentiful as those with longer periods
on the Court. Our findings indicate, however, that the mere fact of having
served on the Court for a longer tenure does not necessarily result in increased
frequency of press mentions. Some Justices with long tenures did not even make
our cut of having more than fifty press mentions. Chief Justice Marshall, for
example, is the fourth longest-serving Justice,105 but he had only a single
reference to the press in his thirty-four years on the Court.106
For similar reasons, we believe that the eras in which these Justices served
are equally telling. All four of these Justices were on the bench during at least
part of the period in which the Court decided the bulk of the cases most
affecting the press. In fact, all four Justices served on the bench together for the
nine years from 1962, when Justice White joined the Court, to 1971, when
Justice Black stepped down.107 Our data show that these years, which spanned
the end of the Warren Court to the beginning of the Burger Court, coincided
with the height of press mentions overall. Our press-friendly heroes,
furthermore, served together for fifteen years from 1956 to 1971—a significant
portion of the most press-heavy era for the Court. Still, this does not mean that
all of the Justices who served during this period were high-frequency Justices.
Justice Frankfurter, for example, served all twenty-three years of his tenure on
the bench with Justices Black and Douglas, yet contributed fewer than half as
many press mentions.108

102. Justice Douglas served for thirty-six years; Justice Black for thirty-four years; and Justice
White for thirty-one years. See Justices 1789 to Present, SUP. CT. U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/
about/members_text.aspx [https://perma.cc/F5RX-FHA5 (staff-uploaded archive)].
103. Justice T. Johnson, for example, served for the shortest amount of time to date, a mere 163
days, before he retired due to poor health. Thomas Johnson Has a Cup of Coffee on the Supreme Court,
FOUNDER DAY (Aug. 25, 2018), https://www.founderoftheday.com/founder-of-the-day/thomasjohnson [https://perma.cc/56GA-2Z6P].
104. At the close of our study, Justice Gorsuch (confirmed in 2017) and Justice Kavanaugh
(confirmed in 2018) ranked among the ten shortest-serving Justices. See Justices 1789 to Present, supra
note 102. Justice Barrett (confirmed in October of 2020) was not included in our study.
105. See Justices 1789 to Present, supra note 102.
106. Justice Chase, who served for fifteen years from 1796 to 1811, also had only one press
reference. See id.
107. See id.
108. Justice Douglas had 612 paragraphs, Justice Black had 481, and Justice Frankfurter had 232.
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Most Press-Friendly Justices of All Time

Why, then, did Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan rise to the top of our
press-friendliness rankings? Again, the period during which they served surely
played a role. These Justices were all on the bench during at least part of the
Court’s press freedom Glory Days in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.109 Not only
was this a period when the Court decided many press-related cases, but it was,
as our tone data show,110 also the height of press-positivity. Thus, these Justices
may have simply been part of a pro-press wave sweeping the Court and the
country.111 Yet, not all Justices from this period received a high Press Support
Score. As is discussed further below, our least press-friendly Justice, Justice
White, also served during this era. Likewise, Justice Frankfurter, who was
previously mentioned as serving all of his tenure with Justices Douglas and
Black, had a Press Support Score of only eight. Instead, an examination of the
writings of Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan, along with their individual
press-characterization data from our study, suggests that they are the most
press-friendly Justices not simply because they served during a particularly
press-positive time, but rather because they were, in fact, the Court’s leaders in
recognizing the valuable roles the press plays and the importance of press
freedom.

109. See Justices 1789 to Present, supra note 102.
110. See supra Section III.B.
111. Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans’ Trust in the Mass Media, GALLUP (Apr. 20, 2004),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/11428/americans-trust-mass-media.aspx [https://perma.cc/29CD-2GCG
(staff-uploaded archive)] (noting the high levels of public trust in the news media in the early 1970s).
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Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan were First Amendment lions and
celebrated advocates for the protection of individual expressive freedoms. Our
data confirm that they were also great allies to the press. Justice Black earned
the highest Press Support Score among the Justices who were above the median
frequency line in Figure 16, and the third highest Press Support Score overall.
During his time on the bench, Justice Black found many opportunities to praise
the press, as seen in Figure 17. He was the fifth most-frequent press
commentator in our dataset, with 481 mentions—a striking 235 (or 49%) of
which were positive and only 8% of which were negative.
Figure 17. Justice Black’s Press Mentions
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Justice Douglas had the highest overall positivity rate in our dataset, with
almost half of his press references indicating positivity and only 12% conveying
negativity, as shown in Figure 18. With 612 mentions, he was our third most
frequent press commentator. His Press Support Score of 84, meanwhile, was
the second highest among the Justices who came in above the median frequency
line and the seventh highest overall. He authored 302 positive mentions,
compared to only 73 negative ones.
Figure 18. Justice Douglas’s Press Mentions
Tone Distribution
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Our last press-friendly hero, Justice Brennan, was the most prolific press
referencer in our dataset with an incredible 650 press mentions. He also earned
a Press Support Score of 76, which put him in third place among the Justices
who were above the median frequency line and eleventh overall. As seen in
Figure 19, 42% of Justice Brennan’s characterizations were positive, while only
15% were negative.
Figure 19. Justice Brennan’s Press Mentions
Tone Distribution
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These three Justices climbed to the top of the press-friendly charts by
taking advantage of opportunities to talk about the press. They frequently
discussed the press in separate opinions, employed positive-leaning frames, and
emphasized the values of a free and vibrant press.
Our heroes were some of the most frequent users of the more positiveleaning frames, like the Regulation, Democracy, and History Frames. They
were the top three Justices to use the Regulation Frame in a positive manner,
with Justice Douglas employing it an astounding 185 times and Justices Brennan
and Black close behind with 147 and 133 references, respectively. Famous for
their roles as two of the only First Amendment absolutists in the Court’s
history, Justices Black and Douglas tolerated few restrictions on press freedom
and often advocated for more press protection than even their other pressfriendly colleagues—viewpoints that boosted their numbers under the
Regulation Frame.
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Concurring in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the seminal 1964 case that
transformed the law of defamation112 and ushered in the press’s Glory Days at
the Court, Justice Black wrote that the Constitution required that the press have
“an absolute immunity for criticism of the way public officials do their public
duty.”113 While Sullivan is widely celebrated by free press advocates for the
broad protection it provides to working journalists, Justice Black made clear that
he did not think it went far enough, writing three years later, in Curtis Publishing
v. Butts,114 that the Sullivan actual-malice rule “is wholly inadequate to save the
press from being destroyed by libel judgments.”115 This approach to government
regulation of the press likely explains why Justice Black only wrote negatively
under the Regulation Frame (i.e., in favor of press regulation of any kind) a
mere 7% of the time.
The Court’s other First Amendment absolutist, Justice Douglas, also often
turned to the Regulation Frame to condemn government interference with the
autonomy of the press. Writing for the Court in Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc. v. Democratic National Committee,116 for example, he insisted that the First
Amendment announces “one hard and fast principle[:] . . . Government shall
keep its hands off the press.”117
Justice Brennan is perhaps most associated in the minds of First
Amendment scholars as the author of the Court’s opinion in Sullivan. He
explained why the First Amendment requires a public official to show actual
malice to succeed in a libel suit118 and specifically spoke about the importance
of protecting the press. Using the Regulation and Democracy Frames, he wrote
that “[w]hether or not a newspaper can survive a succession of such judgments,
the pall of fear and timidity imposed upon those who would give voice to public
criticism is an atmosphere in which the First Amendment freedoms cannot
survive.”119
Perhaps unsurprisingly, our heroes also took the top three medals for their
use of the highly positive Democracy Frame. Justice Brennan earned the top
spot with fifty-four positive references, followed by Justice Douglas with fortyfive and Justice Black with thirty. As an example, in Mills v. Alabama,120 Justice
Black explained why an Alabama law that led to the arrest of a newspaper editor
112. See generally ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (1991) (exploring the historical significance and impact of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
and detailing the context of the time period wherein the case arose).
113. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 295 (1964) (Black, J., concurring).
114. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
115. Id. at 171 (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
116. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
117. Id. at 160–61 (Douglas, J., concurring in the judgment).
118. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269–70, 282–83 (majority opinion).
119. Id. at 278.
120. 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
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was unconstitutional.121 He wrote that the press “serves and was designed to
serve as a powerful antidote to any abuses of power by governmental officials
and as a constitutionally chosen means for keeping officials elected by the
people responsible to all the people whom they were selected to serve.”122 In his
concurrence in the Pentagon Papers case, he also relied on the Democracy
Frame, writing at length about the structural and societal value of the press123
and famously declaring that “[t]he press was to serve the governed, not the
governors.”124 Justice Douglas also wrote positively about the impact of the
press on democracy. For example, in his dissent in United States v. Caldwell125—
one of the consolidated cases in which the Court held there is no First
Amendment right to a reporter’s privilege in criminal grand jury proceedings—
he wrote that the press “has a preferred position in our constitutional scheme,
not to enable it to make money, not to set newsmen apart as a favored class, but
to bring fulfillment to the public’s right to know.”126
Justice Brennan was the top positive user of the Judicial System Frame, a
mixed-tone frame that often captures the Justices’ views on the news media’s
negative impact on the fair trial rights of criminal defendants. Justice Brennan,
however, set himself apart by regularly emphasizing the importance to the
public of vigorous press coverage of the judicial process. For example, in a
concurrence in Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart,127 a case challenging a judge’s gag
order on the press in a high-profile criminal case,128 he wrote that free and robust
reporting, criticism, and debate can contribute to public understanding of the
rule of law and to comprehension of the functioning of the entire criminal
justice system, as well as improve the quality of that system by subjecting it to
the cleansing effects of exposure and public accountability.129
These three Justices also often made it a point to reference the historical
importance of press freedom, thus employing another heavily positive frame.
Justice Black was the top positive user of the History Frame, writing frequently
of the unique historical role of press protections and the Founders’ appreciation
for the value of a free press. In the Pentagon Papers case, for example, he called
the reporting of the newspapers involved in that case “courageous,” stating that
the New York Times, the Washington Post, and other newspapers
should be commended for serving the purpose that the Founding Fathers
121. Id. at 219–20.
122. Id. at 219.
123. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J., concurring) (“Only a
free and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in government.”).
124. Id.
125. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
126. Id. at 721 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
127. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
128. Id. at 541.
129. Id. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
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saw so clearly. In revealing the workings of government that led to the
Vietnam [W]ar, the newspapers nobly did precisely that which the
Founders hoped and trusted they would do.130
Justice Douglas was the second most positive user of the History Frame,
surpassing the other less press-friendly Justices (and, at times, even the press
advocates themselves) in advocating for more robust protections for press
freedom. In his Caldwell dissent, for example, he expressed amazement that the
New York Times—which employed the defendant, reporter Earl Caldwell—
would concede that the government could compel a journalist’s testimony under
any circumstances.131 Relying on the Regulation and History Frames, he wrote:
My belief is that all of the “balancing” was done by those who wrote the
Bill of Rights. By casting the First Amendment in absolute terms, they
repudiated the timid, watered-down, emasculated versions of the First
Amendment which both the Government and the New York Times
advance in the case.132
As discussed earlier, the Right Frame is typically a neutral frame that
nonetheless has a special importance for tracking the Justices’ simple
acknowledgement of the constitutional right to press freedom. It is significant,
therefore, that our most press-friendly Justices often invoked it, taking the top
three spots for neutral uses, with Justice Black in first place with 128 mentions
and Justices Douglas and Brennan in second and third with 113 and 82
references, respectively. But they did more than merely note the First
Amendment right of press freedom; they also spoke of its positive value and
importance more often than any other Justice, sweeping the category of positive
Right Frame mentions with Justice Black making forty-three references,
followed by Justices Douglas and Brennan with twenty-eight and twenty-three,
respectively. These Justices’ frequent inclusion of references to the
constitutional right of press freedom coincides with what Professor David
Anderson calls the “heyday of the Press Clause in the Supreme Court” during
the 1930s to 1960s, in which “the Court invoked the Press Clause in many cases
and appeared to rely on it, rather than the Speech Clause, to protect freedom
of the press.”133
Our most press-friendly Justices rose to the top of our ranking system
through a combination of factors. Serving long tenures during a period when
the Court was actively considering the contours of press freedom was no doubt
130. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J., concurring).
131. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 713 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
132. Id.
133. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, supra note 13, at 448. Justices Black and Douglas both joined
the Court in the late 1930s and served into the 1970s. See Justices 1789 to Present, supra note 102. Justice
Black served from August 19, 1937, to September 17, 1971, and Justice Douglas served from April 17,
1939, to November 12, 1975. Id.
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part of the equation. But our data reveal that these three Justices took—and
often created—opportunities to speak about the press even when their
colleagues did not. And when they did so, they framed the discussions in presspositive ways by shining a bright light on the crucial roles a free press fills in
our society and the unique historical and democracy-enhancing values protected
by the First Amendment’s guarantee of press freedom.
C.

History’s Least Press-Friendly Justice

Conversely, Justice White is the least press-friendly Justice of all time.
During his time on the Court, he wrote about the press often and thus came in
second in frequency with 629 mentions. His view of the press, however, was
decidedly poor, in that a staggering 234 (or 37%) of his references were
negative, while only 22% were positive. Justice White’s Press Support Score is
only nineteen, meaning that he ranked thirty-sixth out of thirty-nine Justices in
our analysis.134
As seen in Figure 20, Justice White often used the negative-leaning
frames. He was the Justice, for example, most likely to speak negatively of the
press’s impact on individuals—a position he took more than twice as often as
the second most negative Justice in this category. When using this frame, he
depicted the press as harmful to individuals 85% of the time. Justice White also
employed mixed-tone frames as vehicles for press negativity. For example, he
was the most-frequent negative user of the Trustworthiness Frame, with about
55% of his characterizations of the reliability and ethics of the press expressed
negatively.

134. Only Justices Pitney, Frankfurter, and Clark have lower Press Support Scores.
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Figure 20. Justice Byron White’s Press Mentions
Tone Distribution
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Justice White also managed to turn the same frames his press-friendly
colleagues were using as vehicles for press positivity into occasions to speak
negatively about the press. While the press-friendly heroes turned to the
Regulation Frame as a common method for conveying positivity, for example,
Justice White led the pack in his negative use of it, with almost three times
more references in which he spoke approvingly of government regulation of the
press than were made by the Justice next behind him on this list. Likewise, he
employed the History Frame—a frame used throughout the Court’s history
with almost complete positivity—in a negative manner 50% of the time. He tied
for first place when it came to making negative statements about the historical
value of the press. In upholding the execution of a search warrant on a university
student newspaper’s newsroom, for example, Justice White expressed
skepticism that the Framers intended for the Constitution to provide the press
protection in such situations, writing that they “did not forbid warrants where
the press was involved, did not require special showings that subpoenas would
be impractical, and did not insist that the owner of the place to be searched, if
connected with the press, must be shown to be implicated in the offense being
investigated.”135
Like the three Justices who emerged as the most press-friendly, Justice
White served on the bench during a period when a significant number of press-

135. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 565 (1978).
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focused cases were on the Court’s docket136 and also had a longer than average
tenure on the bench.137 Therefore, his frequency score benefited from more total
opportunities to opine about the role of the press. But unlike our press-praising
heroes, Justice White worked against the culture of a Court inclined toward
press positivity, which makes his exceptionally low Press Support ranking and
overall negativity even more notable. Many of Justice White’s press references
were in majority opinions that he authored and that his significantly more pressfriendly colleagues joined; thus, he presumably had to temper his rhetoric to
hold their votes.138 With so many fellow Justices eagerly engaged in purposeful
press praise, Justice White stands out for his apparent resistance to that
positivity. The fact that he authored enough press-critical material to overcome
the influence of the Glory Days characterizations is striking.
Indeed, Justice White’s record reflects his active pessimism for the value
of the press. He penned several of the most notable rejections of press
protectiveness in the Court’s history. In Branzburg v. Hayes,139 for example,
Justice White wrote for a five-to-four Court that reporters could not invoke any
First Amendment privilege to protect their confidential sources when
subpoenaed.140 He rejected as “speculative”141 and wrong142 the arguments of
news organizations that the First Amendment’s protection for press freedom
encompasses safeguards for confidentiality in newsgathering in order to ensure
the free flow of crucial information of public concern and to maintain the
historical independence of the press.143 Instead, he spoke broadly of the press’s

136. In fact, in at least a few prominent instances, Justice White also sided with the press. See, e.g.,
N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 730–31 (1971) (White, J., concurring) (agreeing that
the injunction against the press in the Pentagon Papers case was unconstitutional); Mia. Herald v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 259–60 (1974) (White, J., concurring) (arguing against government interference
with the editorial decisions of newspapers).
137. Spanning thirty-one years, from 1962 to 1993, Justice White’s tenure on the Court is the
twelfth longest in history. See Justices 1789 to Present, supra note 102.
138. See infra notes 139–59 and accompanying text.
139. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
140. Id. at 709 (“[P]etitioner must appear before the grand jury to answer the questions put to him,
subject, of course, to the supervision of the presiding judge as to ‘the propriety, purposes, and scope of
the grand jury inquiry and the pertinence of the probable testimony.’”); see also id. at 685 (“[N]ewsmen
are not exempt from the normal duty of appearing before a grand jury and answering questions relevant
to a criminal investigation.”).
141. Id. at 693–94 (“Estimates of the inhibiting effect of such subpoenas on the willingness of
informants to make disclosures to newsmen are widely divergent and to a great extent speculative.”);
see also id. at 674 (“Any adverse effect upon the free dissemination of news by virtue of petitioner’s
being called to testify was deemed to be only ‘indirect, theoretical, and uncertain.’”).
142. Id. at 698 (“We are admonished that refusal to provide a First Amendment reporter’s privilege
will undermine the freedom of the press to collect and disseminate news. But this is not the lesson
history teaches us.”).
143. Id. at 679–81; see also id. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart agreed with the press
organizations and argued that there should be a qualified reporter’s privilege, writing that
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lack of constitutional specialness,144 declaring that those who gather and produce
the news are no different from the “average citizen.”145
In Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.146 and Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,147 Justice
White pounded this theme home. In Cohen, he rejected an argument that a
reporter should be exempt from claims of promissory estoppel rooted in the
publication of a truthful story,148 writing—again for a narrow majority—that
“generally applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment simply because
their enforcement against the press has incidental effects on its ability to gather
and report the news.”149 Four of his colleagues feared the free press would be
dangerously curbed by punishment of “important political speech”150 and
highlighted the “importance . . . to public discourse” of the press’s work.151 But
Justice White found nothing warranting distinct protection for that function.152
Likewise, in Zurcher, he rejected arguments that a newsroom should be
constitutionally protected from police searches for journalist work product,153
suggesting that “surely a warrant to search newspaper premises for criminal
evidence . . . carries no realistic threat of prior restraint or any direct restraint
whatsoever on the publication . . . or on its communication of ideas.”154
The press lost at the hands of Justice White in other contexts, as well. In
Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier,155 he wrote for a majority that dealt a blow to student
journalists, rejecting their challenge to a content-based deletion of stories from
their public school newspaper156 and holding that “[e]ducators are entitled to
exercise greater control over this” form of expression for pedagogical

when a reporter is asked to appear before a grand jury and reveal confidences, I would hold
that the government must (1) show that there is probable cause to believe that the newsman
has information that is clearly relevant to a specific probable violation of law; (2) demonstrate
that the information sought cannot be obtained by alternative means less destructive of First
Amendment rights; and (3) demonstrate a compelling and overriding interest in the
information.
Id. at 743 (footnotes omitted).
144. Id. at 684–85 (majority opinion) (“Newsmen have no constitutional right of access to the
scenes of crime or disaster when the general public is excluded . . . .”).
145. Id. at 682.
146. 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
147. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
148. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 665.
149. Id. at 669.
150. Id. at 675–76 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 677–78 (Souter, J., dissenting).
152. See id. at 670 (majority opinion) (“[E]nforcement of such general laws against the press is not
subject to stricter scrutiny than would be applied to enforcement against other persons or
organizations.”).
153. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 552–53 (1978).
154. Id. at 567.
155. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
156. Id. at 262, 266.
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purposes.157 In Herbert v. Lando,158 he authored the opinion rejecting a television
producer’s First Amendment claim to an editorial privilege that would have
barred pretrial discovery questions related to actual malice, leaving members of
the press vulnerable to costly defense and sweeping inquiries.159
While these more explicit examples of Justice White’s anti-press
jurisprudence have not escaped notice, and his reputation as a press-freedom
skeptic is widely noted,160 our empirical findings indicate that his disapproval
of the press—and cynicism for its protected role—extended beyond these highprofile, doctrinally significant examples. Justice White’s role as a counter-voice
in the otherwise press-friendly Glory Days was not confined to press cases;
rather, it permeated his wider tenure on the Court.161 Significantly, although
several of his press-specific holdings might be characterized as merely declining
to extend additional protections to the press,162 the total coding of his references
reveals the heavy presence of negative characterizations of the press. When
combined with his exceptional frequency of press mentions, this negativity
makes him the clear historical standout for press unfriendliness.
D.

Current Justices’ Attitudes About the Press

We also considered the press references of Justices of the modern Court,
as it existed at the close of our study in July of 2020.163 It is difficult, however,

157. Id. at 271.
158. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
159. Id. at 155, 157, 172 (“Those who publish defamatory falsehoods with the requisite culpability,
however, are subject to liability, the aim being not only to compensate for injury but also to deter
publication of unprotected material threatening injury to individual reputation. Permitting plaintiffs
such as Herbert to prove their cases by direct as well as indirect evidence is consistent with the balance
struck by our prior decisions. If such proof results in liability for damages which in turn discourages
the publication of erroneous information known to be false or probably false, this is no more than what
our cases contemplate and does not abridge either freedom of speech or of the press.”).
160. See, e.g., Michael J. Armstrong, A Barometer of Freedom of the Press: The Opinions of Mr. Justice
White, 8 PEPP. L. REV. 157, 179–85 (1980) (“White has chosen to view common law principles as
restricting the first amendment to a protection of political criticism and from prior restraint.”); Bernard
W. Bell, The Populism of Justice Byron R. White: Media Cases and Beyond, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1425,
1463–65 (2003) (exploring Justice White’s critiques of limiting campaign finance regulations and
opposing the conflation of campaign funding to speech).
161. Armstrong, supra note 160, at 162–66 (explaining “the White style” in the context of cruel
and unusual punishment and criminal investigation cases, among others).
162. See Markus E. Apelis, Fit To Print? Consequences of Implementing a Federal Reporter’s Privilege,
58 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 1369, 1373–74 (2008) (recapitulating Justice White’s analysis in Branzburg
v. Hayes and his conclusion that the “truth-finding function of the grand jury” outweighs reporter
privilege).
163. The data collection in this study concluded in July 2020, with the full set of cases from the
Court’s October 2019 Term. Thus, it does not include any analysis of opinions authored by Justice
Barrett, who was confirmed to the Court on October 27, 2020. See Justices 1789 to Present, supra note
102. In the interest of completeness, this section includes analysis of all nine Justices who sat on the
bench in the last studied Term, including Justice Ginsburg, who died on September 18, 2020. Biography
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to perform the same analyses on these Justices that we conducted on the wider
historical set for two reasons: first, as discussed above, the frequency of press
references has precipitously plummeted in recent years; and second, two of the
nine Justices in this group joined the Court so recently that they have had
relatively few opportunities for press characterization.
Thus, most of the modern Justices are so rarely speaking about the press
that there are simply not enough data points for us to compare their positivity,
negativity, and neutrality toward the press to any statistically significant degree.
Indeed, four of the nine Justices who participated in the 2019 Term do not have
the more-than-fifty references needed to be included in our Press Support
scoring system comparing them to the other Justices throughout history.164
Among those who do make that cut, only Justice Thomas, the longest serving
of the current Justices,165 has authored more than the requisite 150 mentions
needed to fall above the median frequency line shown in Figure 16.166 All of the
other sitting Justices have eighty-five or fewer total references to the press in
their entire body of published writing on the Court. Three of these—Justice
Kagan and two of the newcomers, Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh—have
spoken of the press or the press function ten or fewer times.167
Nevertheless, an investigation of the frequencies, frames, and tones of
press characterizations for each of the modern Justices offers some insights into
the ways that the trends described elsewhere in this Article may be playing out
on the present-day Court. It also helps reveal the areas in which particular
Justices may shape the judicial characterizations of the press in the years to
come.
On the question of frequency, the data reveal that the two most frequent
characterizers of the press on the current Court are the two Justices at its
ideological extremes, when judged by the widely used Martin-Quinn ideology
scores.168 Justice Sotomayor is the current Court’s most liberal member, with a
of Associate Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, SUP. CT. U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biography
Ginsburg.aspx [https://perma.cc/B7TS-BUL8].
164. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh all have fewer than fifty
references.
165. See Justices 1789 to Present, supra note 102.
166. Justice Thomas has a total of 172 mentions of the press.
167. Justice Kagan has spoken of the press ten times, while Justice Gorsuch has four mentions and
Justice Kavanaugh has two.
168. See Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain
Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134, 145–46 (2002). The “MartinQuinn” score is a model that places U.S. Supreme Court Justices on a liberal-conservative ideological
spectrum. Id. A Justice who falls on the more conservative side of the ideological continuum receives a
higher Martin-Quinn score, while more liberal Justices are given lower scores. Id. For updated
information, see Measures, MARTIN-QUINN SCORES, https://mqscores.lsa.umich.edu [https://perma.
cc/H5RC-6UB7 (staff-uploaded archive)] [hereinafter MARTIN-QUINN SCORES]. For a discussion
describing the Martin-Quinn method in a “non-technical fashion that is likely to be understood by a
legal audience,” see Ward Farnsworth, The Use and Limits of Martin-Quinn Scores To Assess Supreme
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2019 Martin-Quinn score of negative 3.48. When the Justices are compared by
their average references per year served on the Court, she is also the sitting
Justice who most frequently mentions the press. In her eleven years on the
Court,169 she has referenced the press or a press function sixty-eight times for
an average of 6.09 references per year. In second place is the Court’s current
most conservative member, Justice Thomas, with a 2019 Martin-Quinn score of
3.69. He has discussed the press or a press function 172 times in his nearly
twenty-nine years on the Court170 for an average of 5.93 references per year. By
contrast, Justice Brennan, the most frequent press mentioner in our full dataset,
characterized the press more than nineteen times per year—over three times
more often than the most active commenters on the current Court. The least
frequent commenter of the press on the current Court is Justice Kagan, with
just six total mentions in a decade as a Justice,171 which translates to an average
of 0.59 mentions per year.
Although it is difficult to make judgments based on their comparatively
short tenures on the Court, two of the most recent appointees to the Court—
Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh—do not seem inclined to go out of their way
to discuss either the press or the press function. In his first two years on the
Court,172 Justice Kavanaugh authored only two references to the press, both in
the Regulation Frame, one positive and one negative. Justice Gorsuch, who had
been on the Court three and a half years by the close of our study,173 only
referred to the press four times, all of which were neutral Communication
Court Justices, with Special Attention to the Problem of Ideological Drift, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1891, 1891–96
(2007). For context, the Justice with the lowest (most liberal) recorded Martin-Quinn score is Justice
Douglas. See MARTIN-QUINN SCORES, supra. During the latter part of Justice Douglas’ tenure on the
Court, he had Martin-Quinn scores of less than negative 7. Id. The highest (most conservative) score
is then-Associate Justice Rehnquist. See id. From 1975 to 1979, Justice Rehnquist had a Martin-Quinn
score of about 4.5. Id. A Justice who scores near zero (moderate) on the scale is Justice Kennedy. Id.
He had a Martin-Quinn score of negative 0.04 during the 2016 Term. Id.
169. At the close of our study, Justice Sotomayor had served from August 8, 2009, until July 31,
2020. Justices 1789 to Present, supra note 102.
170. At the close of our study, Justice Thomas had served from October 23, 1991, until July 31,
2020. Id.
171. At the close of our study, Justice Kagan had served from August 7, 2010, until July 31, 2020.
Id.
172. At the close of our study, Justice Kavanaugh had served from October 6, 2018, until July 31,
2020. Id.
173. At the close of our study, Justice Gorsuch had served from April 10, 2017, until July 31, 2020.
Id. While this Article was going to print, Justice Gorsuch was drawing attention for a dissent from
denial of certiorari in Berisha v. Lawson, 141 S. Ct. 2424 (2021) (mem.), that spoke at length about
some aspects of the press function. See id. at 2425–30 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from the denial of
certiorari); see also Mark Walsh, Will the Supreme Court Reconsider a Landmark Defamation Case?, ABA
J. (July 22, 2021, 11:19 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/web/article/will-the-supreme-courtreconsider-a-landmark-defamation-case [https://perma.cc/T5H2-LE85] (“The dissenting opinion was
buried near the bottom of a busy orders list issued at the end of the U.S. Supreme Court term on July
2, but it has stirred tremors of concern among advocates for press freedom.”). This opinion was not
included in the data set, which concluded in July 2020.
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Frame depictions of the press as an information delivery mechanism. Thus,
although the data are exceptionally limited, neither Justice has actively
contributed to the body of press characterizations.
The other Justices, however, have been on the Court long enough to
produce some observable data about the kinds of characterizations they make of
the press. Among the most interesting is Justice Thomas, whose strong pace of
press characterizations carries distinctive content themes that make a unique
mark on the Court’s overall set of press mentions. He is a major contributor to
the overall number of references within the Right Frame, which captures
references to “the freedom of the press.” He has made thirty such references
over the course of his time on the Court—more than seven times as many as his
contemporaries.174 He most often references the constitutional right neutrally,
simply by naming the freedom without praising the right as special or
important,175 which could be attributed to his tendency to quote the First
Amendment’s text fully and directly.
Even more idiosyncratic is Justice Thomas’s invocation of the History
Frame, which characterizes the press by reference to the views of the Founders.
He is the only member of the current Court to invoke the frame at any time;
none of his colleagues have referenced the historical role of the press even once
in their entire tenures on the Court. With only 163 total references, the frame
has been rarely invoked over the course of the full 235-year dataset. Yet Justice
Thomas generated twenty-two of those references. Even more astounding,
although the History Frame has the highest positivity ratio compared to any
other frame (only 8% total negativity), 18% of Justice Thomas’s use of the frame
have been negative.176 Indeed, Justice Thomas personally accounts for 31% of
the entire dataset’s tonally negative depictions of the press’s position in the
founding era. He is currently tied with our least press-friendly Justice of all
time, Justice White, for the most references invoking the views of the Founders
against, rather than in favor of, the press.
In addition to this uncommon negativity in the predominantly positive
History Frame, Justice Thomas has displayed powerful negativity in his use of
the Individuals Frame—where 89% of his references suggest the press is
harmful to individuals—and in the Trustworthiness Frame—where 100% of his
references suggest the press lacks credibility and ethics. Yet despite all of this,
his overall tone ratio is more positive than any other member of the Court.
Twenty-nine percent of his total mentions were positive; 52% were neutral; and
19% were negative. Justice Thomas’s positive use of the History Frame, coupled
174. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Ginsburg and Alito have each used the Right Frame four
times. Justice Breyer has used it three times and Justice Kagan has used it once. Justices Sotomayor,
Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh have never used it.
175. Twenty-six of his thirty references were neutral.
176. Justice Thomas’s negativity rate within the frame is 19.05%.
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with his heavily positive use of the Regulation Frame, account for much of his
positivity.177
Despite being on the Court nearly as long as Justice Thomas, the late
Justice Ginsburg took far fewer opportunities to reference the press or the press
function. She made only seventy-one total characterizations of the press during
her twenty-seven years as a Justice178 for an average of 2.63 per year. Forty-two
percent of these were neutral references within the Communication Frame,
which means she simply factually conveyed, without more, that the press
functioned as a communicator.179 Her overall positivity rate is just shy of 13%,
contributing to a Press Support Score of sixty, which is slightly below the
median. While Justice Ginsburg’s exceptionally small number of references
within the Democracy and Regulation Frames were heavily positive,180 they
were outweighed by many more references within the Judicial System Frame,
where she had a much more mixed characterization of the press. Ten of her
twenty-two total mentions of the press’s impact on the operation of courts and
the justice system cast the press in a negative light; the remaining twelve were
neutral, such that she never once stated or suggested that the press might have
a positive role in coverage of trials. In nearly three decades on the bench, she
referenced the “freedom of the press” and related concepts only four times,
three of which were tonally neutral, and only once suggested that the right was
special or valuable.
Justice Breyer’s record on press characterizations closely parallels Justice
Ginsburg’s in a number of ways. His overall frequency of press mentions—
eighty-four total mentions in twenty-six years,181 for an average of 3.23 per
year—is slightly higher, as is his overall positivity ratio (20%). But 39% of his
total references over the years have been neutrally toned Communication
Frame mentions.182 Justice Breyer has occasionally suggested that the press
should be free from regulation183 and, more rarely, that it serves democracy.184

177. Sixty-eight percent of his twenty-two History Frame references were positive. Sixty-one
percent of his thirty-eight Regulation Frame references were positive.
178. At the close of our study, Justice Ginsburg had served from August 10, 1993, until July 31,
2020. Justices 1789 to Present, supra note 102.
179. Communication Frame references accounted for thirty of Justice Ginsburg’s seventy-one
frames. One hundred percent of these were coded as tonally neutral.
180. Four of five Regulation Frame references were positive. Two of three Democracy Frame
references were positive.
181. At the close of our study, Justice Breyer had served from August 3, 1994, until July 31, 2020.
Justices 1789 to Present, supra note 102.
182. Thirty-three of his eighty-four references were neutral Communication Frame references.
183. Justice Breyer had twenty-five references within the Regulation Frame, eleven of which were
positive.
184. Justice Breyer had four references within the Democracy Frame, three of which were positive.
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His tone on the trustworthiness of the press has been mixed,185 and his
references to the impact of the press on the judicial system have been nearly
entirely neutral.186 Despite serving on the Court for more than a quarter
century, he has invoked the principle of “freedom of the press” only three times
and has never done so in an overtly positive manner.
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, who joined the Court within four
months of each other,187 have mentioned the press with similar frequency. Chief
Justice Roberts has characterized the press forty-seven times, falling just short
of the number needed to be included in the pool of Justices who were assigned
a Press Support Score. At an average of 3.1 references per year, he is a slightly
less frequent commenter on the press than Justice Alito, who averages 3.68 per
year and has characterized the press a total of fifty-four times. Both have been
tonally neutral in the majority of their mentions.188
The two differ, however, on the negative-positive mix, with Justice Alito
opting for negativity more than twice as often as Chief Justice Roberts,189 who
characterizes the press with positivity 28% of the time to Justice Alito’s 19%.
Chief Justice Roberts has strong positivity mentions in the Regulation and
Democracy Frames,190 which Justice Alito’s record mirrors.191 But Justice Alito
diverges with heavy negativity in the Trustworthiness Frame—where he
uniformly characterizes the press as inaccurate, unethical, and untrustworthy—
and in the Judicial System Frame—where four of his five mentions suggested
the press does harm. Justice Alito’s tendency to speak critically of those facets
of the press place him below the mean in his Press Support Score.
Justice Sotomayor, as discussed above, has commented on the press more
often than her fellow Justices, but her characterizations have often been
unfavorable. With only 12% of her press references tonally positive and 32% of
them negative, her Press Support score is well below the median. Her negativity
totals are heavily influenced by negative characterizations of the press’s role in

185. Justice Breyer had three references within the Trustworthiness Frame—one positive, one
neutral, and one negative.
186. Justice Breyer had eleven references within the Judicial System Frame, ten of which were
neutral.
187. Chief Justice Roberts was confirmed on September 29, 2005, and Justice Alito was confirmed
on January 31, 2006. Justices 1789 to Present, supra note 102.
188. Fifty-six percent of Justice Alito’s full set of press references were neutral. Sixty-two percent
of Chief Justice Roberts’s were neutral.
189. Twenty-six percent of Justice Alito’s references were negative. Eleven percent of Chief Justice
Roberts’s were negative.
190. Three of Chief Justice Roberts’s four uses of the Democracy Frame were positive. Nine of his
thirteen uses of the Regulation Frame were positive, with the remaining four split with three negative
and one neutral.
191. Three of Justice Alito’s four uses of the Democracy Frame were positive; the fourth was
negative. All six of his uses of the Regulation Frame were positive.
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the judicial system192 and her use of the negative tone within the
Trustworthiness Frame, where seven of her eight total mentions suggested that
the press lacks trustworthiness, accuracy, and ethics.
Perhaps the most surprising results on the modern Court involve Justice
Kagan. In her previous professional life as a legal academic, Justice Kagan
“worked on free-speech and free-press issues more than any recent high court
nominee,”193 but since joining the bench, she has almost never spoken of the
press or freedom of the press. In her decade on the Court,194 she has made only
six total references to the press, two of which were mere Communication Frame
references to the press publishing or otherwise making a piece of information
widely known, and one of which was a negative reference to the press’s harm to
individuals. She once neutrally noted the existence of a constitutional right of
press freedom but has never characterized the right as valuable or important.
Justice Kagan’s frequency is the lowest among her peers on the current Court,
and even among these rare characterizations, her negativity outpaces her
positivity.195 Nothing about her record on the Court indicates a propensity to
characterize the press at all, let alone to do so favorably.
Thus, although the dataset is too small to permit meaningful statistical
comparisons of the Justices on the modern Court—either with the wider set of
Justices throughout history or with each other—a qualitative examination of
their characterizations of the press suggests that no sitting Justice is particularly
interested in advancing positivity about the press. A number of them are
actively undercutting some frames once dominated by press praise or avoiding
all but the most neutral mentions of the press required by the facts of the cases
before them. Ultimately, the fact that there are few references to the press from
any Justice currently on the bench suggests that the Court has all but given up
on the once-common endeavor of shaping the discussion of the press and
specifying the value of press functions in a democracy.
CONCLUSION
The vilification of the press by the political branches—a focus of
significant concern in recent years—is matched by a marked and previously
undocumented uptick in negative depictions of the press by the U.S. Supreme
Court. Our large-scale empirical study shows an especially stark abandonment
192. Justice Sotomayor characterized the press within the Judicial System Frame twenty-six times,
thirteen of which were negative and only one of which was positive.
193. Reps. Comm. for Freedom of the Press, Elena Kagan, NEWS MEDIA & L., Spring 2010, at 21,
21.
194. At the close of our study, Justice Kagan had served from August 7, 2010, until July 31, 2020.
See Justices 1789 to Present, supra note 102.
195. Two of Justice Kagan’s six references, or 33%, were negative. One reference, 17%, was positive.
Fifty percent of her mentions (i.e., three) were tonally neutral.

100 N.C. L. REV. 375 (2022)

2021] SUPREME COURT CHARACTERIZATIONS OF THE PRESS

429

of positive judicial depictions of the press in the last fifty years. A generation
ago, the Court actively taught the public that the press was a check on
government, a trustworthy source of accurate coverage, an entity to be specially
protected from regulation, and an institution with specific constitutional
freedoms. Today, in contrast, it almost never speaks of the press, press freedom,
or press functions, and when it does, it is in an overwhelmingly less positive
manner.
All told, in a study of eight frames, three tonal variations, 114 Justices, and
more than 8,000 characterizations of the press over the course of 235 years,
there is not a single indicator that bodes well for the press’s position before the
current U.S. Supreme Court. The Justices today are less likely than their
predecessors a half century ago to recognize the work of the press, the role it
fills in our society, or its constitutional status. When they do discuss the press,
moreover, they are more likely to do so negatively—such as focusing on
perceived ethical lapses or harms inflicted by the press—than positively—like
noting the press’s historical importance or value to democracy.
Given that much of the foundation for the press’s special or protected
societal role has turned on the tenor of the Court’s rhetoric, our findings make
clear that any assumption that the Court is poised to be the branch to defend
the press against disparagement is misplaced. Instead, the trend of sharply
negative tones suggests that the judicial road ahead for the American press will
be bumpy. When members of the press turn to the Court in their legal battles,
they will no longer find an institution that consistently values their role in our
democracy, but rather one that views their place with skepticism or ignores it
altogether.
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